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HOW ABSOLUTE IS THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY 
RULE IN BANKRUPTCY? THE CASE FOR 
STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 
BRUCE GROHSGAL* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article challenges the view that the absolute priority rule 
applies to a “structured dismissal” in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case, 
namely a court-approved settlement of certain claims by or against 
the debtor followed by the dismissal of the case. Under that view, 
the bankruptcy court cannot approve a settlement that makes a 
distribution to holders of junior claims unless it also provides for 
payment of all senior claims in full. The Supreme Court considered 
the question in the fall of 2016 in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 
(In re Jevic Holding Corp.). The question before the Court is: “Whether 
a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement 
proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.” 
The argument that a structured dismissal always must follow 
the absolute priority rule, even when a chapter 11 plan is not con-
firmable, overstates the current statutory reach of the rule. In 
1939, the rule reached its zenith by judicial launch in Case v. Los 
Angeles Lumber Co., when the Court construed the statutory term 
“fair and equitable” as synonymous with “absolute priority.” Con-
gress has circumscribed the rule repeatedly since: in 1952 by 
amending the Bankruptcy Act, in 1978 with enactment of the 
Code, and in 1986 and 2005 by amending the Code. 
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As a result of these statutes, the absolute priority rule is a spe-
cial, limited rule that does not pervade the current Code. Indeed, 
the very reorganization plan—a consensual chapter 11 plan—that 
the Court held was not confirmable in Los Angeles Lumber Co. 
would be confirmable under the current Code. 
This Article concludes that Congress has authorized a bank-
ruptcy court to approve a structured dismissal in chapter 11 when 
it is in the best interest of creditors—such as when a plan is not 
confirmable—even if distributions do not follow the absolute pri-
ority rule. Accordingly, the Court should resolve the current circuit 
split by affirming Jevic. 
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INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURED DISMISSALS AND THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the absolute pri-
ority rule applies to the “structured dismissal” of a chapter 11 case.1 
The bankruptcy court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.) approved a structured dismissal that was not in 
accordance with the absolute priority rule because it provided for 
payments to holders of junior claims without full payment of senior 
claims. The district court and the court of appeals affirmed.2 
The losing creditors in Jevic sought certiorari based on a cir-
cuit court split on the issue.3 The Second Circuit in In re Iridium 
Operating LLC held that a court could authorize a structured dis-
missal that does not make distributions to unsecured creditors in 
accordance with the absolute priority rule if there are specific and 
credible grounds to justify the deviation.4 The Fifth Circuit in In 
re AWECO, Inc., by contrast, stated a per se rule under which all 
settlements outside of a plan, reached at any time in the case, 
must comply with the absolute priority rule.5 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Jevic and will resolve the issue.6 
A structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case is a settlement of 
certain claims asserted by or against the debtor that the bankruptcy 
court approves contemporaneously with its dismissal of the case 
pursuant to the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Un-
like an “old-fashioned,” one sentence dismissal order, an order ap-
proving a structured dismissal typically contains or incorporates 
                                                                                                            
1 The Supreme Court heard arguments for this case on Dec. 7, 2016. See 
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com 
/case-files/cases/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/VU5M 
-LP9Z]. 
2 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), aff’g, Bank. 
No. 08-11006, 2014 WL 268613 (D. Del. 2014). 
3 See id. at 186. 
4 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007). 
5 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
6 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016). 
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012); id. § 349. The term the “Bankruptcy 
Code,” or the “Code” when used in this Article, refers to the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, as amended, which is the current bankruptcy law in the United 
States and is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 
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the substantive settlement terms agreed to by the parties.8 Those 
terms may include releases of the claims settled, an agreed “gifting” 
of the funding for the settlement by one or more secured creditors 
from the proceeds of their collateral, and procedures for reconcil-
ing and paying certain claims.9 A structured dismissal resolves a 
chapter 11 case, typically one in which a plan is not confirmable.10 
At the heart of a structured dismissal is the court’s approval 
of the settlement that will not always adhere to the absolute pri-
ority rule. Parties settle numerous claims and disputes over the 
course of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 
authorizes the bankruptcy court to approve settlements and com-
promises in chapter 11 and in cases filed under other chapters of 
the Code.11 The Rule provides no standard by which a court should 
grant or deny its approval of a settlement. Rather, Rule 9019(a) 
provides simply: “On motion by the trustee and after notice and a 
hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”12 
The Supreme Court requires a bankruptcy court to take a multi-
faceted approach when deciding whether to approve a compromise 
or settlement.13 This method focuses on the complexity, expense, 
and likely duration of the litigation as well as the probability of 
success and collection—weighing the terms of the settlement 
                                                                                                            
8 The grounds for dismissal of a chapter 11 case are set forth in section 1112. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1112. The ordinary effects of the dismissal and the court’s au-
thority to alter those effects “for cause” are set forth in section 349. See § 349. 
9 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 177 (citing In re Strategic Labor, 
Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17, n.10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)). 
10 See id. 
11 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is one of the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which are the procedural rules applicable in 
bankruptcy cases (the “Rules” or the “Bankruptcy Rules”). The Supreme Court 
prescribes the Bankruptcy Rules, pursuant to the power given to it under 28 
U.S.C. § 2075. The Rules are regularly revised even if there have been no interven-
ing amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The current Rules became effective 
on December 1, 2016. 
12 Id. 9019(a). 
13 Id. 9019. In addition, the Code contains provisions for settlements made 
as part of a plan of reorganization or liquidation. Code section 1123(b) (“Con-
tents of plan”) states that a proposed plan may provide for “the settlement or 
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate.” 
11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3) (2012). 
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against the risks and the possible rewards of the litigation.14 The 
Supreme Court set forth this doctrine in the TMT case in 1968,15 
prior to enactment of the Code and the adoption of the current Rule 
9019.16 The courts continue to apply this rule today.17 
The absolute priority rule in present parlance requires that the 
holders of junior claims and interests receive no payment until all 
senior claims and interests receive payment in full—in those cir-
cumstances to which the rule applies.18 Thus, for example, if a 
class of unsecured creditors has voted to reject a chapter 11 plan, 
the shareholders cannot retain or receive shares in the reor-
ganized entity or receive other value on account of their shares, 
unless the plan pays the creditors in the rejecting class in full.19 
The question before the Supreme Court in Jevic is: “Whether 
a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement 
proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority 
scheme.”20 The petitioners in Jevic and the detractors of struc-
tured dismissals say “no,” and they make several arguments in 
support of their position. 
Critics of structured dismissals assert that the absolute prior-
ity rule is “considered sacrosanct,”21 and that any reordering of the 
                                                                                                            
14 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson (TMT), 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 
15 Id. at 424–25 (discussing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended, setting 
forth the multifactor test for evaluating settlements). 
16 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
17 See, e.g., In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting forth the 
multifactor test for evaluating settlements under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 fol-
lowing TMT). 
18 See, e.g., § 1129(b) (applying this rule to a chapter 11 “cramdown” plan). 
A cramdown plan is a plan in which one or more impaired classes have voted 
to reject, and at least one impaired class has voted to accept. See George W. 
Kuney, Cram Down: An Impaired Class of Claims Says “No” but the Plan is 
Confirmed Anyway, COM. BANKR. LITIG. (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.daily 
dac.com/commercialbankruptcy/litigation/articles/cram-down-an-impaired-class 
-of-claims-says-no-but-the-plan-is-confirmed-anyway [https://perma.cc/5N7G 
-D4FW]. A cramdown plan is confirmable if it complies with the absolute pri-
ority rule. § 1129(b). 
19 § 1129(b).  
20 Brief for Petitioner at i, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 
2015) (No. 15-649). 
21 JAYNA PARTAIN LAMAR, THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF CHAPTER 11 IN 
CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES, 87 (Thomas Reuters 
ed. 2016). 
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priorities listed in section 507 through “the alchemy of a ‘structured 
dismissal’” lacks textual support in the Code.22 These detractors 
argue that “Congress has set out a detailed framework of dispute 
resolution in bankruptcy, coupled with substantive rules—princi-
pally the absolute priority rule and the best interest test—that gov-
ern decision making in cases in which consent cannot be obtained.”23 
Under this view, a settlement in a chapter 11 case must adhere 
to the absolute priority rule, as the court held in In re AWECO. 
These commentators contend that the resolution reached in Jevic 
“provides yet one more way to circumvent the Code’s priority 
structure, upon justifications that do not stand under close scru-
tiny.”24 The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Reform appears to have leaned toward this position without 
completely embracing it. The Commission recently recommended, 
in its carefully drafted section on structured dismissals, that bank-
ruptcy courts require “strict compliance with the Bankruptcy 
Code in terms of orders ending the chapter 11 case,” and that a 
“requested dismissal and the dismissal order satisfy the applica-
ble provisions of, and do not permit the parties to work around, 
the Bankruptcy Code.”25 
Detractors make several arguments closely related to this core 
issue. Chapter 11, they assert, “does not specifically provide for 
dismissals that include orders that conclude a case.”26 A structured 
dismissal, they continue, is not a “traditional” exit strategy. In-
stead, it “seem[s] to fall outside the three paths for concluding a 
chapter 11 case under the Bankruptcy Code—confirming a plan, 
converting to chapter 7 or dismissing without ‘bells and whistles.’”27 
                                                                                                            
22 Frederick F. Rudzik, A Priority is a Priority—Except When It Isn’t, 34 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (2015). 
23 Christopher W. Frost, Structured Dismissals: Smooth Off-Ramp or Artful 
Dodge?, 35 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2015). 
24 Id. 
25 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 
11: 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 1, 296 
(2015). This Article argues that a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case that is 
in the best interest of creditors, in which a plan is not confirmable, does strictly com-
ply with and is not a “work around” the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, including the absolute priority rule, the reach of which Congress purposively 
contracted since Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. 308 U.S. 106, 117, 123 (1939).  
26 Frost, supra note 23.  
27 Nan Roberts Eitel et al., Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Out-
side of Code’s Structure?, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2011). 
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These critics further argue that Congress intended a bankruptcy 
court to dismiss a case by a plain vanilla court order that would 
“undo” the bankruptcy and restore all property rights to the posi-
tions of the parties found at the commencement of the case, includ-
ing by unwinding settlements and other postpetition transactions.28 
Finally, they demand a narrow construction of the Code provision 
that authorizes a court to alter ordinary revesting of property of 
the estate on dismissal “for cause” under Code section 349(b)—
one that precludes a deviation from the absolute priority rule that 
they assert is foundational to the structure of the Code.29 
Supporters of structured dismissals begin from the premise 
that—in a chapter 11 case in which the estate has minimal or no 
cash remaining—the debtor cannot confirm a plan or the costs of 
obtaining confirmation will use up any funds that might be avail-
able for distribution to creditors.30 They urge that a structured 
dismissal in that case may be in the best interest of creditors.31 
Does the absolute priority rule preclude a structured dismissal 
in chapter 11 that provides for payments to unsecured creditors other 
than in accordance with the rule yet is in the best interest of cred-
itors? This Article concludes it does not, for several reasons. 
First, the rule was never absolute.32 The rule was not absolute 
in the equity receiverships used for corporate reorganizations prior 
to the extensive amendments made to the Bankruptcy Act in the 
1930s.33 Congress did not make the rule generally or absolutely 
applicable in the 1930s amendments to the Bankruptcy Act ei-
ther. The Chandler Act and other 1930s amendments comprehen-
sively authorized confirmation of bankruptcy plans under chapters 
                                                                                                            
28 Frost, supra note 23; see also Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 21 (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, at 338 (1977); S. Rep. 95-989, at 48–49 (1978)). 
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2012); see also Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 59; 
Christopher H. Frost, Settlements, Absolute Priority, and Another Look at Inter-
Class Give-Ups, 27 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2007) (“[A]ll settlements should be 
subject to the absolute priority rule .... ‘Gifts’ to junior claimants while more 
senior classes remain unpaid violates the basic principles of priority and should 
be prohibited.”). 
30 See, e.g., Brent Weisenberg, Expediting Chapter 11 Liquidating Debtor’s 
Distribution to Creditors, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 106–07 (2012); Norman L. 
Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and 
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56 (2010). 
31 See Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 57. 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 See infra Part II.  
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X (corporate reorganizations), XI (arrangements), XII (real prop-
erty arrangements for persons other than corporations), and XIII 
(wage earners’ plans), in addition to chapter IX (for municipali-
ties) and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935.34 
The term “absolute priority rule” appears nowhere in the Chandler 
Act or the 1930s amendments.35 Rather, the Supreme Court in 
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. and other judicial opinions in the 
dozen years that followed the effective date of the Chandler Act 
established the rule and gave the rule its greatest reach.36 The 
Supreme Court accomplished this by construing “fair and equita-
ble,” which was one requirement for confirmation of a corporate 
reorganization plan, as synonymous with a doctrine of “absolute 
or full priority.”37 
Since the Court’s Los Angeles Lumber decision, Congress repeat-
edly has dialed back those decisional extensions and has restricted 
applications of the rule that led to undesirable outcomes.38 In 1952, 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to expressly excise the 
“fair and equitable” requirement—and thus the absolute priority 
rule—from chapters XI and XII, to which chapters the Supreme 
                                                                                                            
34 See generally 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 
73-486, 48 Stat. 911 (1934) (enacting corporate reorganization provisions in-
cluding § 77B for plan confirmation) (referred to in text as “1934 Amend-
ments”); Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) 
(incorporating the 1934 Amendments and comprehensively enacting reorgani-
zation and plan provisions for business entities and individuals) (referred to in 
text as “Chandler Act”); Municipal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 
(1937); Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935). 
35 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 
Stat. 911 (1934); Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 
840 (1938). 
36 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117, 123 (1939); see 
also Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520–21, 525 (1941); 
Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 484, 515 (1943). 
37 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 122–24. Unlike the present Code, the 
Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Chandler Act and other 1930s amendments, 
did not define “fair and equitable” to mean “absolute priority,” even though prior to 
1952 one requirement for plan confirmation under chapters IX, X, XI, XII, and 
XIII and under section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act was that the plan 
was “fair and equitable.” See id. The present Code provides that a cramdown 
plan must be “fair and equitable,” and defining that term to mean the absolute 
priority rule in that limited context but in no broader context. Id. 
38 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 31, 31 nn.221–22 (1995). 
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Court had extended it, and from chapter XIII to preclude its ap-
plication in that chapter, thereby keeping the rule to chapter X of 
the Act.39 The Code that Congress enacted in 1978 combined the 
old chapters X, XI, and XII into a new chapter 11.40 The 1978 Code 
removed the requirement of absolute priority from consensual plans 
in chapter 11.41 The Code also confined the rule’s application to 
the holders of claims or interests in a voting class that rejected 
the plan, and thus deprived dissenters within any accepting class 
of the treatment afforded by the rule.42 In 1986, Congress enacted 
chapter 12 to permit family farmers to confirm a plan without 
complying with the rule,43 which chapter Congress expanded to 
include family fishermen in 2005.44 
Second, the absolute priority rule does not pervade the current 
Code’s structure or even chapter 11 of the Code, as is often sug-
gested.45 In light of the history of congressional enactments sum-
marized above, this is not a legislative accident or a drafting 
glitch. The absolute priority rule does not apply at all to a consen-
sual chapter 11 plan, i.e., a plan that all voting classes have ac-
cepted by the requisite majorities in each class. It does not apply 
to the dissenting creditors in an accepting class of a cramdown 
plan, i.e., a plan that at least one voting class has accepted and at 
least one voting class has rejected.46 It does not apply in chapter 9 
                                                                                                            
39 1952 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 579, Pub. L. No. 82-456, 
§§ 35, 43, 50, 66 Stat. 420, 433, 435, 437 (1952). 
40 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 35. 
41 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012); Tabb, supra note 38, at 35.  
42 See § 1129(a)(1)–(9), (11)–(16) (2012) (consensual plan); § 1129(a)(10)–(b) 
(cramdown plan). 
43  Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (1986) (the 
chapter 12 confirmation requirements are codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225). 
44 Chapter 12 was made permanent and was amended to apply to family 
fishermen by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
45 See infra Part III. 
46 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b). Both a consensual plan and a cramdown plan 
must provide for full payment of priority unsecured claims ultimately. Id. How-
ever, even dissenters within an accepting class of a higher priority unsecured 
claims can be required to accept deferred payments made after full payment to 
lower priority unsecured claims if the higher priority class has accepted by the 
requisite majorities. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i). 
 
2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 451 
(for municipalities),47 chapter 12 (for family farmers and family 
fishermen),48 chapter 13 (for individuals with regular income),49 
or chapter 15 (for cross-border cases).50 
Rather, the Code requires application of the absolute priority 
rule in only two places. The rule applies to a chapter 7 liquidation 
pursuant to section 726 (which by express provision of the Code 
does not apply in chapter 11)51 and to a chapter 11 cramdown plan, 
and then it applies only to the members of the rejecting class.52 
The Code does not require that distributions follow the absolute 
priority rule in any other situation. The absolute priority rule under 
the current Code is a special, limited rule. It is not a rule that op-
erates substantively throughout the Code. 
Third, Congress has given the bankruptcy courts wide discre-
tion in approving compromises and settlements.53 The Code does 
not require the court to determine that a compromise or settle-
ment comports with the absolute priority rule.54 Indeed, the Code 
does not list the criteria for court approval of a settlement in a 
chapter 11 case outside of a plan. In the absence of congressional 
direction, the Supreme Court has required a settlement to be fair 
and equitable based on the court’s determination of the value of 
the compromise as compared with the likely risks and rewards of 
pursuing the litigation.55 
Fourth, Congress has directed the bankruptcy courts to resolve 
a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable on consider-
ation of the best interest of debtor’s creditors—and not to resolve 
the case by adhering to the absolute priority rule. Section 1112 
provides that a bankruptcy court shall dismiss the case or convert 
it to chapter 7, “whichever is in the best interests of creditors and 
                                                                                                            
47 §§ 901–46. 
48 §§ 1201–31. 
49 §§ 1301–30. 
50 §§ 1501–32. 
51 § 726(a)(1). Section 507 says nothing of distribution, and only section 726 
requires distributions in accordance with the absolute priority rule in chapter 7. 
Section 726 does not apply in chapter 11. Section 103(b) expressly provides that 
subchapter II, in which section 726 is found, applies only in chapter 7. §103(b). 
52 § 1129(b). 
53 See infra Part IV. 
54 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
55 See id.; see, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer 
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424–26 (1968). 
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the estate, for cause ....”56 “Cause” under section 1112 expressly 
includes the inability to confirm or consummate a chapter 11 plan.57 
Congress has underscored this directive and policy in Code 
section 349, which governs the effects of dismissal.58 Section 349 
does not require adherence to the absolute priority rule or refer to 
distributional priorities.59 It does not direct a court to unwind set-
tlements approved or other transactions authorized prior to the 
dismissal.60 Section 349 provides that on dismissal, estate prop-
erty revests in the debtor or other entity in which the property 
vested immediately prior to the commencement of the case, unless 
the court orders otherwise.61 The property that revests on dismissal 
is that remaining in the estate at the time of the dismissal, both 
pursuant to the better reading of the text of section 349 and by 
well-reasoned precedent.62 The revesting provision of section 349 
does not require a court, expressly or by implication, to reverse a 
settlement approved by the court or any of the numerous other 
transactions that the debtor and other parties entered into, whether 
on the first day of the case or the last day prior to the dismissal.63 
Congress, moreover, has given bankruptcy courts additional, 
wide discretion in Code section 349 to order “for cause” that the 
property of the estate vest in different parties on dismissal.64 This 
authority underscores the congressional policy favoring a resolution 
of a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not possible based on what 
is in the best interest of creditors. 
                                                                                                            
56 § 1112(b)(1). The court also may make the intermediate decision, if it is 
in the best interest of creditors, to appoint a chapter 11 trustee to administer 
the estate, and the trustee may later propose a chapter 11 plan or move to convert 
to chapter 7. See id. 
57 § 1112(b)(1). “Cause” under section 1112(b) includes that there exists a 
“substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence 
of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,” or that the debtor is unable to sub-
stantially consummate a plan. § 1112(b)(4). 
58 § 349. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 § 349(b)(3). 
62 See infra Part VI.B. 
63 § 349(b)(3). 
64 § 349(b). The Code does not provide illustrative examples of what might 
constitute “cause” in section 349(b), underscoring the congressional grant of broad 
discretion to the bankruptcy courts in this section. 
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The dismissal provisions of the Code highlight a more founda-
tional principle of the Code than absolute priority—the best in-
terest of creditors and the estate.65 Bankruptcy is not always a 
pretty or predictable place. Congress has recognized this feature 
of failure in the numerous sections of the Code that expressly au-
thorize a bankruptcy court to make its decision and grant relief 
based on the best interest of creditors66 and to exercise its discretion 
for cause when determining the relief that it will grant.67 This 
Article does not suggest that Congress has given the bankruptcy 
court unbridled discretion to resolve a chapter 11 case in which a 
plan is confirmable by a structured dismissal that does not follow 
the absolute priority rule. To the contrary, the Code’s design points 
to confirmation of a plan of reorganization or liquidation, if that is 
                                                                                                            
65 See, e.g., § 349(b)(3); § 1307(c) (“[W]hichever is in the best interests of 
creditors and the estate ....”). 
66 See, e.g., § 327(d) (establishing that trustee or debtor in possession may 
employ lawyers, accountants, and other professionals if in the best interest of 
the estate); § 521(i)(4) (stating court may decline to dismiss individual case in 
which debtor failed to make required filings, if the best interest of creditors 
would be served by the continued administration of the estate); § 521(j)(2) 
(providing that if the debtor fails to file a tax return that becomes due after the 
commencement of the case, the court may convert or dismiss the case, which-
ever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate); § 546(h) (noting that 
trustee or debtor in possession may return goods, if in the best interests of the 
estate); § 726(a)(1) (providing that the trustee shall close the estate as expedi-
tiously as is compatible with the best interest of parties in interest); § 721 (stating 
that the court may authorize chapter 7 trustee to operate the debtor’s business 
if in the best interest of the estate and consistent with the orderly liquidation 
of the estate); § 943(b)(7) (requiring that chapter 9 plan must be found to be in 
the best interests of creditors for the court to confirm it); § 1170(a)(1) (allowing 
a court to authorize abandonment of a railroad line if abandonment is in the 
best interest of the estate and essential to formulation of a plan); § 1307(c), (e) 
(establishing that court may convert a chapter 13 case to chapter 7, or may 
dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors); § 1324 (allowing 
a court to hold a chapter 13 confirmation hearing less than 20 days after the meet-
ing of creditors, if in the best interests of the creditors). The Code, in section 
1129(a)(7), also requires that any chapter 11 plan satisfy the “best interest of 
creditors test.” Under the test, all holders of claims and interests who vote 
against a plan, even those in an accepting class, must do no worse under the plan 
than they would in a chapter 7 liquidation. The absolute priority rule by comparison 
protects only those in a class that votes against the plan. § 1129(a)(7). 
67 See infra notes 458–66 for Code provisions in which “for cause” is the statu-
tory standard under which the bankruptcy court is authorized to grant relief. 
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possible, as a primary goal of chapter 11.68 However, in a chapter 
11 case in which a plan is not confirmable, a structured dismissal 
that benefits creditors is not an end run around the plan process 
or the absolute priority rule to which Congress has given limited 
application in the current Code. Rather, the best interest of cred-
itors (which is a more pervasive policy and goal under the current 
Code than the absolute priority rule that Congress has persistently 
circumscribed) specifically and expressly governs the court’s decision 
whether to dismiss or convert. The Code, moreover, specifically and 
expressly empowers the court to exercise its discretion “for cause” 
by ordering dismissal on terms that best achieve that end.69 
This Article concludes that a bankruptcy court has authority 
under the Code to approve a settlement and structured dismissal 
in a chapter 11 case when it is in the best interest of creditors, 
even if distributions among unsecured creditors are not in accor-
dance with the absolute priority rule. 
I. WHY STRUCTURED DISMISSALS? 
A structured dismissal remains the exception rather than the rule 
in chapter 11. Chapter 11 cases more often conclude by the con-
firmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization or liquidation,70 
or, if no party is able to confirm a plan, by a conversion of the 
chapter 11 case to chapter 7.71 Still, the use of structured dismissals 
to resolve chapter 11 cases likely has increased as of late72 and has 
drawn mostly negative views. 
Bankruptcy court approval of a structured dismissal is most 
often sought by parties in a case in which the prepetition secured 
creditor has a blanket lien against nearly all  of the debtor’s prop-
erty, but the value of the debtor’s collateral is less than the 
                                                                                                            
68 See § 1129.  
69 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2015); see also 
Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 56. 
70 The provisions for obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan are set 
forth in Code §§ 1121–29. Though chapter 11 is titled “Reorganization,” a chap-
ter 11 plan may be a liquidating plan. See § 1129(a)(11). 
71 The provisions for converting a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 are set forth 
in section 1112. Chapter 7 is titled “Liquidation” and contemplates only the 
liquidation of the debtor’s property for distribution to creditors. § 1112. 
72 See, e.g., In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 181 (citing Pernick & 
Dean, supra note 30). 
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amount of the claim, i.e., the creditor is undersecured.73 A secured 
creditor’s lien or security interest continues in the proceeds of any 
sale of the collateral, both under state law and by court order as 
adequate protection of the creditor’s interest on a free and clear 
sale in the bankruptcy case.74 If the proceeds of the sale are less 
than the amount of the secured claim, the secured lender also re-
mains undersecured after the sale.75 
In such a situation, the debtor must pay the sale proceeds to 
the secured creditor in partial satisfaction of the claim, leaving the 
debtor and other creditors with nothing.76 The debtor thus will 
not be able to pay the costs of preparing, proposing, soliciting votes 
for, and seeking and obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.77 
                                                                                                            
73 The second, far less common situation is one in which the key constituen-
cies reach agreement regarding a comprehensive settlement of the case, and 
there are sufficient funds available to pay the settling parties and any other 
claimants in full. In such a case, rather than seeking dismissal under Code 
section 1112, the parties may ask the court to abstain from hearing the bank-
ruptcy case and to dismiss the case under Code section 305. That section pro-
vides: “The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this 
title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if—
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such 
dismissal or suspension ....” § 305(a)(1). A dismissal under section 305(a) gen-
erally is not appealable, and courts accordingly treat abstention and dismissal 
under section 305(a) as an “extraordinary remedy”—that is, appropriate only 
if both the debtor and its creditors would be better served by the court’s ab-
stention and dismissal of the case. In re Monitor Single Lift I, Ltd., 381 B.R. 
455, 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 
1023 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (“Where … the workout is comprehensive, and de-
signed to end, not perpetuate, the creditor-company relations, dismissal under 
section 305(a)(1) is appropriate. One ‘reorganization,’ under these circumstances, is 
enough. Section 305(a)(1) precludes an encore, thereby furthering the policies 
of expedition, economy, and good sense.”). A motion for abstention under sec-
tion 305(a) raises concerns, since in such a case a plan might be confirmable. 
But, because all creditors and equity holders typically will have agreed to the 
treatment afforded or will be paid in full, those resolutions do not implicate the 
absolute priority rule and are thus not considered further in this Article. 
74 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (stating 
that security interest in personal property attaches to proceeds on sale); § 363(e) 
(stating that the holder of lien against estate property that is sold in the bank-
ruptcy case free and clear of interests is entitled to adequate protection of its inter-
est, typically accomplished by the court’s attaching the lien to the proceeds). 
75 See § 506.  
76 Id.  
77 See generally Pernick & Dean, supra note 30.  
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Most crucially, the debtor will have no funds with which to make the 
payments to priority unsecured creditors required to confirm a plan 
or to make any distributions to general unsecured creditors.78 
A conversion to chapter 7 is an equally bleak prospect in such 
a case. The chapter 7 case will be a “no asset” case. The secured 
creditor’s lien will continue in effect, and the chapter 7 trustee 
will not be able to pay anything to other creditors.79 
It is against these unpromising alternatives that some or all 
of the major constituencies in the case—typically the debtor and 
some or all of the secured creditors and unsecured creditors—may 
negotiate for a structured dismissal. In a typical structured dis-
missal, the secured creditor will agree to fund a settlement that will 
result in some payment to some creditors prior to the dismissal.80 
The secured creditor who agrees to fund the structured dismissal 
rarely does so purely from altruism. In exchange, the creditor will 
secure a release of any claims that the debtor or other settling 
parties have asserted or may assert against the creditor and will 
put an end to the costs the creditor is incurring.81 The settlement 
typically will exclude a party that is unwilling to agree to a release 
or from whom the secured creditor determines it needs no release.82 
As a result, a structured dismissal negotiated by willing parties 
in chapter 11 may provide for payment of claims, which deviate 
from the absolute priority rule that applies to distributions in 
chapter 783 or that applies to the holders in a rejecting class under 
a chapter 11 cramdown plan.84 Critics urge that in such a case, 
the structured dismissal violates the absolute priority rule and 
thus the court cannot approve it.85 
                                                                                                            
78 See § 507.  
79 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/handbook-chapter-7-trustees [https://perma.cc/L9WU 
-A4YC]. A case in which no assets will be available for distribution to creditors 
is a “no-asset” or “no-distribution” case. See id. ch. 8. There is no deadline for 
the filing of proofs of claims by creditors, and the chapter 7 trustee is not re-
quired to review or seek to disallow any claims that are filed because doing so 
would be a pointless exercise. Following the closing of the case, the chapter 7 
trustee receives a sixty dollar fee. Id. 
80 See Frost, supra note 23. 
81 See id.  
82 Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 57–58.  
83 § 726. 
84 § 1129(b). 
85 Frost, supra note 23. 
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II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND 
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL EXTENSIONS AND 
UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE 
One narrative of structured dismissals and the dynamics of 
reorganization practice describes a “wondrously talented” bar of 
bankruptcy lawyers who “manage to continually resurrect prac-
tices that are manifestly inconsistent with positive law, sometimes 
even in the face of outright prohibitions of said practices by Con-
gress and the Supreme Court.”86 Bankruptcy counsel, the story 
goes, succeed in obtaining questionable results for their clients by 
asserting little more than that expediency is required.87 For these 
commentators, settlements and structured dismissals are an “end 
run” around the absolute priority rule and are a case in point.88 
Implicit in this critique is that bankruptcy judges, swayed by 
expediency arguments, make exceptions to pervasive and immu-
table requirements expressly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, 
such as the absolute priority rule. These critics conclude that 
courts instead need to follow the congressional directive even when 
it is not convenient to do so. 
This account is simply and materially inaccurate. The terms 
“absolute priority rule” or “absolute priority” do not appear anywhere 
in the Bankruptcy Code.89 Congress likewise mentioned nothing 
of an absolute priority rule in the 1934 Amendments that established 
a regime for corporate reorganization,90 or in the 1938 Chandler 
Act,91 which are the bankruptcy statutes that preceded the Code. 
Rather, section 77B of the 1934 Amendments merely required 
a corporate reorganization plan to be “fair and equitable” for the 
                                                                                                            
86 Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “Inter-
Class Gifting Is Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!,” 31 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 
(2011). 
87 Id. 
88 Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 59 (“Desire to make an end run around a 
statute is not an adequate reason .... It is not part of the judicial office to seek 
out creative ways to defeat statutes.”); Frost, supra note 23. 
89 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust Ass’n v. 
203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 442 (1999) (“The latter condition [in 
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)] is the core of what is known as the ‘absolute priority rule.’”). 
90 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 
Stat. 911 (1934). 
91 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-695, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). 
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bankruptcy court to confirm it.92 The 1938 Chandler Act and 
other 1930s bankruptcy enactments that extensively amended 
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act also did not require bankruptcy plans 
to comply with an absolute priority rule. Instead, the Supreme 
Court in 1939, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., em-
bedded the rule into the corporate reorganization confirmation 
provisions of the Chandler Act when it interpreted the textual re-
quirement that a confirmable plan be “fair and equitable” to require 
compliance with a rule of “full and absolute priority.”93 
Subsequent congressional enactments contradict any argument 
that Congress acquiesced in this interpretation. Congress, since 
Los Angeles Lumber, has consistently reduced the reach of the ab-
solute priority rule.94 First, in 1952, Congress severely contracted 
the judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act by which the 
courts had extended the requirement of absolute priority to con-
firmation of all consensual and cramdown plans in chapters X, XI, 
and XII of the Act. By the same amendment, Congress preemp-
tively removed the requirement from chapter XIII.95 In 1978, Con-
gress made absolute priority in chapter 11 applicable only to the 
holders in a dissenting class of cramdown plan.96 In 1986 and 
2005, Congress acted again to make the rule inapplicable to plans 
proposed by family farmers and family-owned commercial fishing 
operations.97 Congress, by these numerous enactments, made the 
absolute priority rule inapplicable to chapter 9 plans, consensual 
chapter 11 plans, chapter 12 plans, and chapter 13 plans. The rule 
today has only two applications: first, to the holders of claims or 
equity interests in a class that has voted against a chapter 11 
cramdown plan, and second, in a chapter 7 liquidation case. 
                                                                                                            
92 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, § 77B(f), 52 Stat. at 919.  
93 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939). 
94 See infra notes 95–107 and accompanying text.  
95 The House in its report explained that, first,  
the fair and equitable rule, as interpreted in Boyd and Los An-
geles Lumber, “cannot realistically be applied in a chapter XI, 
XII, or XIII proceeding. Were it so applied, no individual debtor 
and, under chapter XI, no corporate debtor where the stock 
ownership is substantially identical with management could 
effectuate an arrangement except by payment of the claims of 
all creditors in full …. Nor is it practicable or realistic to apply 
the rule in a proceeding under chapter XI, XII, or XIII.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 2320, ¶ 43, at 21 (1952).  
96 See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1157–58 (2d ed. 2009).  
97 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 198 (1988).  
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As Congress acted on these occasions to severely constrict the 
reach of the absolute priority rule following expansive judicial inter-
pretations and to address other undesirable consequences arising 
from those decisions, it is simply untrue that a wayward bankruptcy 
bench and bar ran end runs around the absolute priority rule or 
sidestepped congressional requirements. To the contrary, Congress 
consistently and on numerous occasions reined in the decisional 
law that raised and then extended the rule. 
This section of the Article begins with a brief account of the 
origins and extent of the “absolute” priority rule in the equity re-
ceiverships by which most railroads reorganized prior to the en-
actment of reorganization legislation by Congress in the 1930s. 
The rule, even in those cases, more often commanded “relative” 
rather than “absolute” distributional priority. Next, this section 
summarizes the construction of the “fair and equitable” require-
ment for confirmation of plans under the 1930s amendments to 
the Act and the Supreme Court’s expansive construction of the 
rule in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. Finally, this section 
considers the congressional enactments that followed Los Angeles 
Lumber, in 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005, that severely narrowed 
the application of the absolute priority rule. 
A comprehensive analysis of the scope of the rule prior to Los 
Angeles Lumber and the arc of congressional enactments since that 
opinion demonstrate that the absolute priority rule does not per-
vade the bankruptcy law. Rather, the rule never was absolute prior 
to Los Angeles Lumber. Further, Congress has consistently restricted 
the scope of the rule since the Court’s decision in that case. 
A. The Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule 
The rules of distributional priorities in reorganization cases have 
their origins in the equity receivership cases by which insolvent 
railroads reorganized across state lines in the 1800s.98 The abso-
lute priority rule, strictly applied, requires payment first to secured 
creditors and then payment to unsecured creditors of an insolvent 
enterprise, prior to shareholders receiving any stock in the reor-
ganized entity or other value on account of their shares in the old 
                                                                                                            
98 Tabb, supra note 38, at 21–23 (discussing equity receiverships). 
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entity.99 However, the rule underlying equity receiverships appears 
to have been one of relative or weighted distributional priorities 
from the start.100 The doctrine of equity receiverships can best be 
characterized as one designed to prevent overreaching by the se-
cured bondholders, managers, and shareholders acting in concert 
to deprive unsecured creditors of any distribution in the reorgani-
zation of the business enterprise. 
The use of the equity receivership rather than a bankruptcy 
statute to reorganize a railroad arose out of necessity.101 The Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to establish uniform bankruptcy 
laws.102 Though Congress enacted bankruptcy or insolvency laws 
pursuant to this power in 1801, 1841, and 1867,103 it repealed each 
after several years without replacement; so, for most of the 19th 
century, no federal bankruptcy law was in effect.104 Further, none 
of the 19th century Bankruptcy Acts enabled a corporation to re-
organize.105 Rather, they merely provided for the liquidation of 
the bankrupt’s assets for distribution to creditors.106 
The equity receivership enabled a troubled railroad to reorganize 
and thus preserve its business as a going concern, as opposed to 
                                                                                                            
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Congress has the authority to “establish ... uniform laws on the subject 
of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
103 See infra note 106 (discussing relevant statutes).  
104 Tabb, supra note 38, at 13–14. 
105 See generally id. at 14–29.  
106 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by Bankruptcy 
Act of 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 
(1841), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843); and 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Bankruptcy 
Act of 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). Though none of those 19th century Bank-
ruptcy Acts enabled a corporation to reorganize or provided for the confirma-
tion of bankruptcy plans as under current law, an 1874 amendment to the 1867 
Act did briefly allow for compositions of creditors until the 1867 Act was re-
pealed in 1878. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, § 18 at 182–84. See, 
e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 54–60 (2001); see also In re Jeppson, 66 B.R. 269, 272 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1986) (“Until the enactment in 1933 and 1934 of Sections 77 and 77B of the 
Bankruptcy Act, there was no statutory machinery generally available to facil-
itate the reorganization of insolvent corporations. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
had concerned itself almost entirely with liquidation of the debtor’s assets and 
distribution of the proceeds among creditors ....”). 
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a piecemeal liquidation of the enterprise’s assets.107 Maintaining 
the railroad as a business enterprise maximized values for stake-
holders and benefitted the public and the economy.108 The equity 
receiverships for most of the 1800s filled the void left by the non-
existence of a federal bankruptcy act and, until the 1930s, by the ab-
sence of reorganization provisions in the federal bankruptcy acts. 
The debt and capital structures of 19th century railroads were 
highly developed, with secured bondholders (often holding several 
issues and classes of bonds), unsecured creditors, and shareholders 
(typically holding several classes of both preferred and common 
shares) each holding a stake in the enterprise.109 The insolvent 
railroad’s assets were extensive, consisting of real estate interests, 
rolling stock, and other tangible and intangible personal property 
located in several states.110 
A creditor upon the railroad’s default, or the railroad itself in 
contemplation of such default, would initiate the equity receiver-
ship by seeking and obtaining the appointment of a receiver for the 
railroad’s assets in federal district court.111 Usually various com-
mittees of creditors were formed, which would negotiate a restructur-
ing of the debt and the capital structure for the new, reorganized 
entity.112 Once the committees reached an agreement, they com-
bined into a single reorganization committee authorized to credit 
bid up to the face value of the secured bonds at the foreclosure 
sale.113 Competing bidders willing to pay more than the face amount 
of the secured debt were rare.114 As a result, the reorganization 
committee usually purchased all or most of the railroad’s assets 
at the foreclosure sale and transferred those assets to the new cor-
poration in which the old holders of debt or equity were given the 
agreed upon debt and/or equity in the new, reorganized railroad.115 
Sometimes, though, a creditor or other senior stakeholder would 
object that it was receiving nothing (or not enough) on account of 
                                                                                                            
107 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 57. 
108 See id.  
109 See id. at 58. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 59. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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its claim against the old entity, and that a junior stakeholder, 
such as a shareholder, was receiving too much. The courts began 
to develop rules for distributional priorities—the purpose of which 
was to enable a court to determine the fairness of the value pro-
posed to be given on reorganization to creditors and shareholders 
on account of their claims against the old entity.116 
The aim of these distributional rules was to protect creditors 
from overreaching by the managers and shareholders who nego-
tiated the restructuring with the secured bondholders.117 The Su-
preme Court in 1868 in Railroad Co. v. Howard set down the rule 
that the proceeds of the sale of a business corporation are “assets 
of the corporation, and as such constitute a fund for the payment 
of its debts”; if the plan distributed proceeds to stockholders but 
left any debts of the corporation unpaid, then the “established 
rule in equity” was that the stockholders took the funds “charged 
with the trust in favor of creditors,” which a court of equity would 
order paid in satisfaction of the creditors’ claims.118 The existence 
of a mortgage lien against the assets sold did not change this: 
“whatever interest remained after the lien of the mortgages was 
discharged belonged to the corporation, and as the property of the 
corporation when the bonds were discharged, it became a fund in 
trust for the benefit of their creditors.”119 
The Supreme Court visited the issue again in Louisville Trust 
Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. in 1899. The Court asked whether 
the mortgagor and mortgagee could enter into an agreement “by 
which[,] through the form of equitable proceedings[,] all the right” 
of an “unsecured creditor may be wiped out, and the interest of both 
mortgagor and mortgagee in the property preserved and continued? 
The question carries its own answer. Nothing of the kind can be 
tolerated.”120 
The rule established by Howard and Louisville Ry. Co. was a 
safeguard against abuse of unsecured creditors by the secured 
creditors, managers, and shareholders who took the lead in nego-
tiating the restructuring. In late nineteenth-century equity re-
ceiverships, the doctrine took into account the relative priorities 
                                                                                                            
116 See id. at 67. 
117 Id. 
118 Chi., R.I. & P.R. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 410 (1868). 
119 Id. at 414. 
120 Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899). 
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of the secured and unsecured debt and of the shares of preferred 
and common stock in the old railroad’s debt and capital struc-
ture.121 It restrained managers and shareholders from misappro-
priating all the residual value or control premium value in the 
enterprise unless the reorganization plan paid a reasonable amount 
to all creditors.122 
The rule, though, did not require distributions of value in 
strict accordance with an absolute priority rule. Instead, the re-
organization plans allocated and distributed values in the new 
entity in a way that gave everyone something in rough proportion 
to the seniority of their claims and interests in the insolvent en-
terprise.123 Further, participation in the new enterprise of old eq-
uity holders, who were the most junior stakeholders in the insolvent 
enterprise, often was conditioned on their paying “assessments,” 
i.e., making cash contributions to the reorganized entity.124 
A reorganization plan would provide, for example, that senior 
secured bondholders would receive new bonds equal to most or all 
of the value of their claims against the assets (e.g., the holder of 
$1,000 first priority secured bonds against the assets of the old 
railroad would receive $1,000 first priority secured bonds against 
the assets of the new railroad).125 Junior secured bondholders 
would receive a combination of secured debt in a reduced amount 
and preferred shares in the new entity.126 Old preferred and com-
mon shareholders would receive new shares and/or bonds, pro-
vided they were willing to pay cash assessments.127 The funds 
raised by assessments paid dissenting security holders and the 
expenses incurred by the railroad during the receivership, and 
funded new capital expenditures.128 
Notably absent from this typical restructuring were general 
unsecured creditors—the vendors of goods and services and others 
                                                                                                            
121 See SKEEL, supra note 106, at 58–59. 
122 See id. at 60.  
123 See id. at 59. 
124 Peter Tufano, Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial 
Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 1, 14 (1997). 
125 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 106, at 58–59. 
126 Id. 
127 Tufano, supra note 124, at 14. 
128 Id. 
 
464 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 
who had done business with the railroad day-to-day, extending credit 
in the ordinary course of business. In 1913, Northern Pacific Railroad 
Co. v. Boyd “threw a monkey wrench into all of this.”129 Boyd, an 
unsecured creditor, objected to a reorganization under which he 
received nothing.130 The railroad had sold for $61 million at a sale 
“where there was no competition.”131 The encumbrances against 
it were $157 million.132 Yet, the reorganization agreement stated 
that the value of the railroad was $345 million.133 Further, the pur-
chaser immediately following the sale issued $190 million of new 
bonds and $155 million of stock on property that a month before 
had been bought for $61 million.134 
The Supreme Court stated that a “transfer by stockholders 
from themselves to themselves” could not defeat the claim of a 
non-assenting creditor such as Boyd.135 “As against him the sale 
is void in equity, regardless of the motive with which it was made,” 
and the subordinate interest of the old stockholders remained 
“subject to his claim in the hands of the reorganized company.”136 
Boyd further complicated matters for reorganizers.137 Even 
Boyd, though, did not establish an absolute priority rule in reor-
ganization cases. Shareholders still could participate in the reor-
ganization but “only if unsecured creditors were given ‘a fair and 
timely offer of cash, or a fair and timely offer of participation in 
such corporation.’”138 
The Supreme Court in Kansas City Terminal stated 15 years 
later that all parties to a reorganization, including the public, “are 
best served by [cooperation] between bondholders and stockhold-
ers.”139 If creditors decline a fair offer, “they are left to protect 
themselves. After such refusal they cannot attack the reorganization 
                                                                                                            
129 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67. 
130 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 492 (1913). 
131 Id. at 508. 
132 Id. at 507. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Boyd, 228 U.S. at 502. 
136 Id. 
137 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67. 
138 Id. (citing 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS SUCCESSORS 
173 (1946)). 
139 Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926). 
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in a court of equity.”140 Further, if it was impossible to obtain new 
value from shareholders unless they were “permitted to contribute 
and retain an interest sufficiently valuable to move them,” then “[i]n 
such or similar cases the chancellor may exercise an informed dis-
cretion concerning the practical adjustment of the several rights.”141 
Bonbright and Bergerman, reviewing case law in the late 1920s, 
concluded that the courts showed a distinct leaning toward relative 
priority.142 Courts were “reluctant to upset a plan, when accepted 
by a substantial majority of interested bond-holders, merely on the 
                                                                                                            
140 Id. (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913)) (“Unsecured 
creditors of insolvent corporations are entitled to the benefit of the values which 
remain after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or prospective, for 
dividends or only for purposes of control. But reasonable adjustments should 
be encouraged. Practically, it is impossible to sell the property of a great railroad 
for cash and, generally, the interests of all parties, including the public, are 
best served by co-operation between bondholders and stockholders. If creditors 
decline a fair offer based upon the principles above stated, they are left to pro-
tect themselves. After such refusal they cannot attack the reorganization in a 
court of equity.”); see also Jameson v. Guar. Tr. Co., 20 F.2d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 
1927) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508) (“The Boyd decision does 
not require that in the reorganization each interest must be accorded the same 
rank in every particular it formerly held. The most it holds is that the stock-
holder’s interest in the old company may not, as against unsecured creditors, 
be carried into the reorganized company, and these creditors wholly disre-
garded. The court said: ‘This conclusion does not, as claimed, make it necessary 
to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders retaining an 
interest in the reorganized company. His interest can be preserved by the issu-
ance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he declines a fair 
offer, he is left to protect himself as any other creditor or a judgment debtor, 
and, having refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be 
heard in a court of equity to attack it.’”); Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation: 
The SEC and the Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 591, 597 (2010) [hereinafter Present at the Creation] (stating that the rule 
in Boyd “merely insists that, in whatever priority regime existed, everyone par-
ticipate. The question of exactly what priority rights each investor enjoyed was 
actively debated in the law reviews over the next twenty-five years.”); but see 
Samuels v. Ne. Pub. Serv. Co., 174 A. 127, 131 (Del. Ch. 1934) (citing N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 510) (“It is inequitable for the court to appropriate 
to stockholders rights in assets which belong to creditors.”). 
141 Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co., 271 U.S. at 455. 
142 See James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of 
Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. 
L. REV. 127 (1928) [hereinafter Two Rival Theories]. 
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ground that it violate[d] absolute priorities in favor of approximate 
relative priorities.”143 
In sum, though many courts and commentators have referred 
to the distributional doctrine in equity receiverships as an “absolute 
priority rule,”144 it was not. Instead, the courts in the 1800s and 
early 1900s often applied a rule of “relative” (rather than absolute) 
priority.145 The rule prevented the secured creditors, managers, 
and stockholders from freezing out the company’s unsecured cred-
itors and paying them nothing while equity retained an interest.146 
However, under the pre-1930s case law under which some of the 
largest business enterprises of the time were reorganized, those 
unsecured creditors only had a right to participate on fair terms 
in the reorganized company in which old equity would have an 
interest.147 They were not entitled to insist that a plan conformed 
to an absolute priority rule.148 
                                                                                                            
143 Id. at 154; see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974–76 (1989) (citing Two Rival Theories) (“Fifteen years 
after Boyd, two scholars were able to argue that corporate practice recognized 
two priority rules—a rule of absolute priority, à la Boyd, and a rule of ‘relative’ 
priority, functioning in practice much like the informal ‘share’ scheme that ob-
tained before Boyd.”); Randolph J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New 
Value, 72 AM. BANKR. L. J. 387, 401 (1998) (“Boyd did not adopt an absolute 
priority rule. In simplest terms, the Boyd rule was that equity could not receive 
anything for its old interests unless unsecured creditors received something 
too. Although Boyd required that a fair offer be made to unsecured creditors, 
it did not say how the fairness of any offer would be determined, and it certainly 
did not require payment in full.” Even “the seminal Howard case ... suggested 
that creditors would only be entitled to the sixteen percent fund reserved for 
stockholders, not necessarily to be paid in full. Thus, instead of adopting the 
absolute priority rule, Howard and Boyd merely set the stage for the debate 
between two possible views of priority, one which is absolute and one which is 
relative. Those rules were not even given those names until fifteen years later” 
by Bonbright and Bergerman.); SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67–68 (stating that 
railroad reorganizers after Boyd “offered general unsecured creditors a contin-
uing interest in the reorganized firm so long as they, like the stockholders, paid 
a cash assessment”). 
144 Haines, supra note 143, at 387 n.3. 
145 Id. 
146 Ayer, supra note 143, at 964. 
147 See Present at the Creation, supra note 140, at 605. 
148 See, e.g., id. at 597 (“The [Boyd] opinion itself, however, does not confront 
the question of whether receivership law could continue to accept a regime of 
relative priority analogous to the rule of the general average. It merely insists 
that, in whatever priority regime existed, everyone participate. The question 
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B.  “Fair and Equitable” Under the Chandler Act 
Congress, in the early years of the Great Depression and in 
response to its effects, enacted a series of amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.149 The 1934 amendments added a new sec-
tion, 77B, to the Act, entitled “Corporate Reorganizations.”150 Under 
Section 77B, a court could confirm a corporate reorganization plan 
if it determined that the plan was “fair and equitable” and ful-
filled certain other requirements.151 Widespread municipal bond 
defaults152 caused Congress to enact a municipal bankruptcy 
chapter, chapter IX, in the same year.153 The reorganization of 
insolvent railroads under the Bankruptcy Act was the subject of 
amendments in 1935.154 In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler 
Act, which extensively overhauled U.S. bankruptcy law, making 
further changes to and incorporating many of those earlier De-
pression era amendments in the 1898 Act.155 
                                                                                                            
of exactly what priority rights each investor enjoyed was actively debated in 
the law reviews over the next twenty-five years.”). 
149 See 1933 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (1933); 
1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. Law. No. 73-296, 48 Stat. 
911 (1934) (“1934 Amendments”); Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 
49 Stat. 911 (1935). Congress during this period also enacted the Frazier-
Lemke Act for bankruptcy relief to financially distressed farmers, which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional. See generally Louisville Joint Stock 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
150 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act § 77B(f). 
151 Id. 
152 See Solicitor General Jackson’s statements in United States v. Bekins, 
304 U.S. 27, 34 (1938), that “[c]ities as large as Detroit and Miami and Asheville 
were in default” and, by 1938, “over 3,000 units of government were found to 
be in default.” 
153 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798 (1934). The 
1934 municipal bankruptcy chapter was declared unconstitutional in Ashton 
v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). In 1937, Con-
gress enacted a new municipal act, which the Court held as constitutional. See 
1937 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937); accord 
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). The 1937 municipal bankruptcy 
act contained sunset provisions, and Congress several times reenacted it. The 
municipal bankruptcy chapter was originally chapter X. The Chandler Act des-
ignated it as chapter IX, which parallels its present place as chapter 9 of the Code. 
154 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935). 
155 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938); see also Tabb, supra 
note 38, at 29–30; Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act—Its Effect Upon 
the Law of Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 380, 380–406 (1940); Herman M. 
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The Chandler Act established for the first time a comprehen-
sive statutory regime for the restructuring of the financial affairs 
of a corporation or the rehabilitation of an individual debtor by a 
plan confirmed by the court.156 The statutory provisions for these 
plans appeared in four chapters of the Chandler Act’s amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Act: chapter X (corporate reorganizations);157 
chapter XI (arrangements);158 chapter XII (real property arrange-
ments for persons other than corporations);159 and chapter XIII 
(wage earners’ plans).160 The acts that provided for municipal ar-
rangements (chapter IX) and railroad reorganizations continued 
in effect.161 
Each of chapters X–XIII required the court to confirm a pro-
posed plan if it was “fair and equitable” and fulfilled the other 
conditions set forth in that chapter.162 The Chandler Act, though, 
did not define “fair and equitable,” and it remained for the Su-
preme Court to do so.163 
                                                                                                            
Knoeller, Reorganization Procedure Under the New Chandler Act, 24 MARQ. L. 
REV. 12, 12 (1939). 
156 The Chandler Act amended and incorporated section 77B into chapters 
X–XIV of the Chandler Act. See generally Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. 
Law No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). It amended, but did not repeal or incor-
porate, the provisions of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935 or the provi-
sions of the 1937 municipal bankruptcy law, Ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937), 
though it designated the municipal chapter as chapter IX. Id. § 3(a). For busi-
ness enterprises, the reorganization provisions of the Chandler Act “embodie[d] 
the new social economic concept of reorganization and the rehabilitation of the 
debtor and his business as a going concern, instead of the liquidation, distri-
bution, and stoppage of business with the consequent loss to the debtor, credi-
tors, employees, and the public generally.” Knoeller, supra note 155, at 14. For 
wage earning individuals, the provisions of the Act provided relief “from harass-
ments of garnishments and attachment proceedings.” Id. 
157 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, §§ 101–276, 52 Stat. 
840, 883–905 (1938). 
158 §§ 301–99. 
159 §§ 401–526. 
160 §§ 601–86. 
161 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935); Munici-
pal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937). 
162 Chandler Act of 1938, § 221(2) (chapter X); § 366(3) (chapter XI); § 472(3) 
(chapter XII); § 656 (chapter XIII). 
163 See generally Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, 52 
Stat. 840 (1938). 
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C.  The Supreme Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Defines 
“Fair and Equitable” to Require Absolute Distributional Priority 
in a Plan 
The debtor in Los Angeles Lumber was a holding corporation that 
owned six subsidiary corporations; only one of which, a dry dock com-
pany, had substantial assets.164 In early 1938, the debtor petitioned 
for corporate reorganization under the 1934 Amendments.165 The 
trustee proposed a plan, which the bankruptcy court, with some 
modifications, confirmed.166 The plan provided for the organization of 
a new corporation to which the trustee would transfer all of the assets 
of the subsidiary dry dock company free and clear of liens.167 Bond-
holders would receive preferred stock in the reorganized entity, 
additional preferred stock would be sold to generate additional work-
ing capital, and common stock would be issued to the holders of 
old equity.168 
The plan was “properly approved in writing” by all of the following 
affected classes of creditors and shareholders, and by overwhelm-
ing majorities in each: 
 
(a) The owners and holders of 92.81 per cent face value 
of debtor’s outstanding bonds; 
(b) 100 per cent, in amount, of other creditors; 
(c) The owners and holders of 99.75 per cent of debtor’s 
outstanding Class A capital stock; 
(d) The owners and holders of 90 per cent of debtor’s out-
standing Class B capital stock.169 
 
The district court sitting in bankruptcy confirmed the plan over 
the objection of dissenters who held $18,500 of the bonds.170 The 
court determined that the plan was “fair and equitable” and that old 
equity could receive the new shares.171 The dissenting bondholders 
                                                                                                            
164 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1939). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 24 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D. Cal. 1938). 
170 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 112 (1939). 
171 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d at 965. 
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appealed to the Ninth Circuit.172 They asserted, among other 
claims, that the plan was neither fair nor equitable as to them, and 
that “the trial court erred in allowing the present stockholders of 
the insolvent debtor to participate in the reorganization.”173 
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s findings that 
the present shareholders, by cooperating in the plan, had given 
new value that exceeded the value of their new stock under the 
plan.174 The shareholders had modified a prepetition forbearance 
agreement, and their cooperation and participation in the new 
company preserved the going concern value of the dry dock com-
pany, avoided further litigation, and enhanced the value of the 
enterprise because of their familiarity with the business of the 
dry dock subsidiary and their financial standing and influence in 
the community.175 
The objecting bondholders sought and obtained certiorari from 
the Supreme Court.176 The Supreme Court per Justice Douglas 
held that the Ninth Circuit had erred in at least three material 
respects.177 
First, the Supreme Court determined that “fair and equitable” 
in section 77B(f) were “words of art” that “had acquired a fixed 
meaning through judicial interpretations in the field of equity re-
ceivership reorganizations.”178 The words “fair and equitable” in 
Douglas’s view meant that a bankruptcy plan needed to satisfy 
the rule of “full or absolute priority,” at least insofar as it kept 
shareholders from receiving anything prior to full payment to 
creditors.179 Douglas reasoned that the Supreme Court’s equity 
receivership decisions had “dealt with the precedence to be ac-
corded creditors over stockholders in reorganization plans.”180 The 
                                                                                                            
172 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 106. 
173 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d at 965. 
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 106. 
177 Id. at 122–24. 
178 Id. at 115.  
179 Id. at 115–17. 
180 Id. at 115–16 (citing Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 
(1868); see also Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674 
(1899); N. Pac. Ry. Cent. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Kan. City Terminal Ry. 
Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445 (1926)). 
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stockholder’s interest in the property “is subordinate to the rights 
of creditors; first, of secured and then of unsecured creditors.”181 
Second, the Court held that the requirement that the plan 
must be “fair and equitable” applied even to a consensual plan, 
such as the Los Angeles Lumber plan, which had been accepted 
by all affected classes of creditors and shareholders.182 The court 
was “not merely a ministerial register of the vote of the several 
classes of security holders.”183 Consent of all affected classes by 
the majorities required by section 77B was not a substitute for the 
court’s determination that the plan was fair and equitable,184 and 
absent such determination, the court could not confirm the plan.185 
Third, the Court held that the absolute priority rule shielded the 
holder of each claim or interest, without regard to how the holder or 
its class voted.186 Thus, the absolute priority rule applied regard-
less of whether the holder was in an accepting class or was in a 
rejecting class.187 “All those interested in the estate are entitled 
to the court’s protection,” and specifically to the shelter of the “ab-
solute or full priority doctrine” that the court had established.188 
The Court found that the debtor was insolvent on a balance sheet 
basis, and thus that there was no value in the enterprise beyond 
that available for partial payment to creditors.189 The distributions 
of shares in the reorganized debtor to the old shareholders of the 
debtor violated the absolute or full priority doctrine.190 Thus, the 
plan was not fair and equitable and could not be confirmed.191 
It is fair to say that the Court’s determination in Los Angeles 
Lumber that “fair and equitable” were words of art requiring absolute 
                                                                                                            
181 Id. at 116 (quoting Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 
U.S. 674 (1899)). It has not gone unnoticed that Justice Douglas, who wrote 
the opinion, had joined the court less than a year earlier from serving as chair 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that his opinion adopted 
“much of the substance of an amicus brief filed by the SEC” in the case. Ayer, 
supra note 143, at 974. 
182 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 114. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See id. 
188 Id. at 114, 123. 
189 Id. at 119–21. 
190 Id. at 131–32. 
191 Id. 
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priority in distributions—and from which its second and third 
holdings flowed—was something of a reach. The term “fair and 
equitable” was not defined in section 77B or elsewhere in the 1898 
Act as amended, and the term “absolute or full priority doctrine” 
was not used in the Act at all, either before or after the 1930s 
amendments.192 Further, the Chandler Act and the other Depres-
sion Era amendments to the Bankruptcy Act used the term “fair 
and equitable” elsewhere, in several different contexts that 
clearly meant much different things.193 
Moreover, Douglas’s statement that the term “fair and equita-
ble” had acquired a fixed meaning in the equity receivership cases 
was, as Ayer has put it, “poppycock, and Justice Douglas knew it. 
None of the Supreme Court’s absolute priority cases had used that 
particular phrase in that particular way.”194 Specifically, the Su-
preme Court had not used the term “fair and equitable” in any of 
the cases which Douglas cited.195 
Regardless, the decision stood. Congress had enacted the 
Chandler Act shortly before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Los 
Angeles Lumber, though section 77B of the 1934 Amendments, 
and not the Chandler Act, applied to the case. The Chandler Act 
required a plan to be “fair and equitable” under all four of its chap-
ters enabling reorganizations or arrangements,196 which opened 
the door to further extensions of the absolute priority rule to several 
chapters of the Act. 
D. The Courts Extend the Absolute Priority Rule to Plans Under 
Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Chandler Act 
The Chandler Act incorporated the 1930s amendments and 
made other changes to the Bankruptcy Act. The Chandler Act’s 
provisions required a plan to be fair and equitable in chapter X 
(corporate reorganizations), chapter XI (arrangements), chapter 
                                                                                                            
192 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424, sec. 77B, § 1, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (1934).  
193 See infra notes 407–08. 
194 Ayer, supra note 143, at 975. 
195 See Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 115–16 (citing Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co. 
v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (1868); Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. 
Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899), N. Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Kan. City 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445 (1926)). 
196 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, § 221, 52 Stat. 840, 
897 (1938). 
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XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corpora-
tions), and chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans) for the court to con-
firm it.197 The fair and equitable requirement also applied to 
plans under chapter IX (municipal arrangements)198 and under 
section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act.199 
It is not surprising, then, that in the several years following 
the decision in Los Angeles Lumber, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts applied the absolute priority rule to chapter X (corporate 
reorganizations),200 chapter XI (arrangements),201 chapter XII (real 
property arrangements for persons other than corporations),202 
and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act.203 The Court 
in Los Angeles Lumber held that the absolute priority rule was 
“firmly embedded” in the “fair and equitable” requirement for 
plan confirmation in section 77B.204 It followed that the rule 
would apply to chapters X through XII of the Chandler Act and to 
the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1934, because those chapters 
also expressly required a plan to be “fair and equitable” for it to 
be confirmed.205 
                                                                                                            
197 Id. §§ 221(2), 366(3), 472(3), 656.   
198 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 657, § 83(e), 50 Stat. Ann. 653, 655 (1937); 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 438, § 83(e), 54 Stat. 667, 669 (1940); Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, ch. 434, Pub. Law No. 77-622, § 84, 56 Stat. 377 (1942); Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, ch. 532, § 83(e), 60 Stat. 409, 410 (1946). As noted above, the ab-
solute priority rule was never applied in chapter 9 cases. 
199 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, § 77B(e), 49 Stat. 911 (1935). 
200 See, e.g., Marine Harbor Props. v. Mft.’s Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78, 86–87 (re-
ferring to the “full priority rule” of Boyd and Los Angeles Lumber), aff’g 125 
F.2d 296, 298 (2nd Cir. 1942). 
201 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940) (“‘Fair 
and equitable,’ taken from § 77B and made the condition of confirmation under 
both Chapter X or Chapter XI are ‘words of art’ having a well understood meaning 
in reorganizations in equitable receiverships and under § 77B which is incor-
porated in the structure of both Chapters X and XI.”). 
202 See, e.g., In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1941). 
203 Grp. of Institutional Inv’rs v. Chi., M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 
523, 541–42 (1943). 
204 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939). 
The Supreme Court decided Los Angeles Lumber after the 1938 effective date 
of the Chandler Act, but because the case was filed prior to that effective date, 
section 77B applied. Id. at 119–20 n.14; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424, 
§ 77B(f), 48 Stat. 911, 919 (1934).  
205 Chandler Act of 1938, §§ 221(2), 366(3), 472(3), 52 Stat. 840, 897, 911, 923 
(1938); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424, sec. 77B(f), § 1, 48 Stat. 911, 918–19 (1934).  
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In chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans), the Los Angeles Lumber 
interpretation of “fair and equitable” as “words of art” requiring 
absolute distributional priority does not appear to have been con-
sidered in any published decision. The closest an opinion came to 
considering the issue was Justice Owen Roberts’s dissent in a 5–3 
decision in the chapter XI case of Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. United States Realty & Improvement Company.206 Roberts 
suggested in dissent that the wholesale application of those words 
of art to a chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans) case might not be an 
appropriate reading of the Chandler Act.207 In chapter IX (for mu-
nicipalities), the courts declined to interpret “fair” and “equitable” 
to mean absolute priority with respect to confirmation of the mu-
nicipality’s plan.208 The Supreme Court asked not whether the 
plan satisfied the absolute priority rule, but whether the “plan in 
its practical incidence embodie[d] a fair and equitable bargain 
openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle.”209 
                                                                                                            
206 U.S. Realty, 310 U.S. at 461–69 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
207 Id. at 467. (“The short answer is that the phrase is used not only in chap-
ter XI and chapter X but also in chapter XII respecting real property arrange-
ments, and in chapter XIII respecting wage earners’ plans. Obviously the 
phrase as used in the Chandler Act must be given the connotation appropriate 
to the section in which it is used.”). 
208 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 657, sec. 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658 (1937); 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 438, § 83(e), 54 Stat. 667, 669 (1940); Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, ch. 532, § 83(3), 60 Stat. 409, 414 (1946); see also Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, ch. 434, § 84, 56 Stat. 377 (1942). 
209 Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146 
(1940). The Court in City of Avon Park wasted no ink trying to reconcile its 
interpretation of “fair and equitable” in that case with its reading of the same 
words in Los Angeles Lumber, likely for two reasons. See generally id. First, a 
court cannot force a municipality, as a subdivision of a sovereign state, to sell 
its assets. Second, a municipality has no stockholders or other owners of equity 
whose interests are junior to creditors. Today’s commentators follow this view, 
noting that in “a municipal debt adjustment case the strict fair and equitable 
rule of corporate reorganizations cannot be applied without some adjustments.” 
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(A) (Alan N. Resnick & Sommer eds., 
16th ed., 1941). One adjustment is that the “fair and equitable rule” does not 
prevent a municipality from retaining its property and continuing to operate, 
even if the plan does not provide for payment in full to creditors. Id. But, the 
City of Avon Park opinion frustratingly said nothing of any of this. See gener-
ally 311 U.S. 138, 1940.  
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Circuit court decisions required a finding that the payments under 
the plan were all that the municipality was “reasonably able to pay 
in the circumstances.”210 The express statutory term “fair and equi-
table” simply did not mean absolute and full priority in chapter IX. 
E. 1952—Congress Removes the Absolute Priority Rule from 
Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act 
In 1952, Congress cut back the absolute priority rule, little more 
than a decade after Los Angeles Lumber.211 Congress used a sharp 
knife, deleting the term “fair and equitable” from the plan confir-
mation requirements for chapter XI (arrangements),212 chapter 
XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corpora-
tions),213 and chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans)214 of the Act. To 
make matters clear, Congress further amended each chapter to 
state expressly that plan confirmation “shall not be refused solely 
because the interest of a debtor,”215 or if “the debtor is a corporation, 
the interests of its stockholders or members will be preserved under 
the arrangement.”216 
                                                                                                            
210 Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282, 283 (9th Cir. 1944); see 
also Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing 
West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941)); Moody v. James Irrigation Dist., 114 
F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 693 (1941); Bekins v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Jordan v. Palo 
Verde Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 693 
(1941); COLLIER, supra note 209, ¶ 943.03(f)(1)(A). 
211 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939). 
212 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 579, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952) 
(amending § 366 of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that an 
“Arrangement” under Chapter XI be “fair and equitable”) [hereinafter 1952 
Amendments]. 
213 1952 Amendments, sec. 472, § 43, 66 Stat. at 435 (amending section 472 
of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that a “Real Property Ar-
rangement” under Chapter XII be “fair and equitable”). 
214 1952 Amendments, sec. 656, § 50, 66 Stat. at 437 (amending section 
656(a) of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that a “Wage Earners’ 
Plan” under Chapter XIII be “fair and equitable”). 
215 1952 Amendments, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. at 437; see id. at sec. 472, § 43, 
66 Stat. at 433. 
216 1952 Amendments, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. at 433 (applying only in chap-
ter XI, because chapters XII and XIII were not applicable to corporations). 
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The contraction of the absolute priority rule that the 1952 amend-
ments accomplished was no accident. Critics of the rule asserted 
that it was pointlessly impractical.217 The amendment was advis-
able, as was noted in the Senate Report, because the “fair and 
equitable rule” as reaffirmed in Los Angeles Lumber could not be 
applied in a chapter XI, XII, or XIII proceeding “without impair-
ing, if not entirely making valueless, the relief provided” by those 
chapters.218 The House Report similarly stated it was not “practi-
cable or realistic to apply the rule in a proceeding under chapter 
XI, XII, or XIII,” and that the “proposed amendment is designed 
to remove the fair and equitable provision” and make “clear that 
the rule of the Boyd and Los Angeles cases shall not be operative 
under those three chapters.”219 Following the 1952 amendments, 
the absolute priority rule applied only to corporate reorganization 
plans in chapter X and to railroad reorganization plans under the 
Railroad Reorganization Act.220 
F. 1978—Congress Enacts the Code and Removes the Absolute 
Priority Rule from the Requirements for Confirmation of a 
Consensual Chapter 11 Plan 
The 1970s witnessed a material reevaluation of U.S. bankruptcy 
law. In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States to reconsider the law.221 The Commis-
sion recommended a comprehensive revision of the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                            
217 See, e.g., Note, Absolute Priority under Chapter X—A Rule of Law or a 
Familiar Quotation, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 921 (1952) (arguing absolute pri-
ority, as stated by the Supreme Court, left “no room for the by-play of equitable 
factors”). It closed the door on the “pragmatic approach,” and “therein [lay] its 
weakness. A rule of law which fails to recognize the uniqueness of each case 
and the sense of justice of he who administers it, though universally reiterated, 
is bound to be honored in the breach rather than in the observance.” Id. 
218 S. REP. NO. 1395, at 11 (1952). 
219 H.R. REP. NO. 2320, ¶ 43, at 21 (1952). 
220 Chandler Act, ch. 575, sec. 221, 52 Stat. 840, 897–98 (1938); Railroad 
Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, sec. 77(e), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935). Junior 
creditors and interest holders in chapters XI, XII, and XIII were protected by 
the requirement, that the plan provide at least as much to creditors as they 
would have received in a liquidation, i.e., the “best interests of creditors” test. 
See Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Ab-
solute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 67–68 (1989). 
221 S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 84 Stat. 468 (1970). 
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system in its 1973 report to Congress,222 including combining 
chapters X, XI, and XII into a single, new business reorganization 
chapter and a “more flexible” absolute priority rule.223 
The Commission spelled out in detail its view of the deficien-
cies of the absolute priority rule. Criticisms included that the rule 
did “not work well on a practical level,” it often led to “a large 
amount of useless litigation,” and served “only to prevent reason-
able compromises and to wipe out the interest of shareholders.”224 
Absolute priority seemed to the Commission “to leave no room for 
the by-play of equitable factors. It close[d] the door on the ‘prag-
matic approach’—therein [lay] its weakness.”225 
The decision in Los Angeles Lumber had rigidly required sat-
isfaction of the absolute priority rule even for a consensual plan 
that all classes had approved.226 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Los Angeles Lumber had reversed confirmation of a reorganization 
plan that 90 percent or more in each class, including 100 percent 
of unsecured creditors, had voted to accept.227 
The Commission recommended a new rule by which a trustee 
could obtain confirmation of a consensual plan, such as the one in 
Los Angeles Lumber, even if the plan did not comply with the ab-
solute priority rule.228 If no publicly held securities were affected, 
and the court found that the plan had been “knowingly and vol-
untarily accepted by all the creditors and equity security holders 
materially and adversely affected by it after full disclosure,” then 
no finding of valuation as a basis for applying the fairness doctrine 
would be required.229 This modification would permit “the continu-
ation of negotiated settlements by the debtor with small groups 
of creditors,” as under chapter XI at the time.230 By these changes, 
                                                                                                            
222 EXEC. DIR. OF THE COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 93-137 (1973) (Pts. I, II) [hereinafter 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]. 
See Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule 
for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1786 n.1 (1974). 
223 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222, pt. I, at 248. 
224 Id. pt. I, at 256. 
225 Id. pt. I, at 256, 258. 
226 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 24 F. Supp. 501, 511 (S.D. Cal. 1938). 
227 Id. at 507. 
228 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222, pt. I, at 257.  
229 Id. pt. II, at 252. 
230 Id. pt. I, at 258; see also id. pt. II, at 252. 
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the “fairness test” would be “made more flexible and the so-called 
‘absolute priority’ doctrine” would be “substantially modified.”231 
Congress recognized that evolution in the capital structures of 
companies also supported changing the Los Angeles Lumber rule. 
The House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
noted that when Congress enacted the Chandler Act in 1938, most 
public investors in bankrupt companies held unsecured claims in 
the form of debentures in “corporations [that] were more often 
privately held.”232 In that setting, “the absolute priority rule pro-
tected debenture holders from an erosion of their position in favor 
of equity holders.”233 By the 1970s, if there were public security 
holders in a bankruptcy case, they likely held either subordinated 
debentures or shares.234 Thus, in chapter X, the application of the 
absolute priority rule had lead “to the exclusion, rather than the 
protection, of the public.”235 A House amendment permitted con-
firmation of a plan with respect to “a particular class without resort 
to the fair and equitable test if the class ha[d] accepted or [was] 
unimpaired under the plan.”236 A dissenting member of the class 
would be protected not by the absolute priority rule, but instead 
by the best interest of creditors test, by which the distribution under 
the plan to a dissenter in the accepting class would need to be at 
least as much as the dissenter would receive in a liquidation.237 
                                                                                                            
231 Id. pt. I, at 258; see also id. pt. II, at 252 (“[I]f the court finds that the 
plan has been knowingly and voluntarily accepted by all creditors and equity 
security holders materially and adversely affected by it after full disclosure,” 
then “the court need not make the findings” that the plan is fair and equitable.). 
232 H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 222 (1983). 
233 Id., as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6468. The First Circuit in 
In re Continental Mortg. Investors noted concerns with the distinctions be-
tween chapter XI, “intended primarily to protect the rights of trade creditors,” 
to which the absolute priority rule did not apply after the 1952 Amendments, 
and chapter X, “intended primarily for the protection of public investors,” to 
which the absolute priority rule still applied after the 1952 Amendments. 578 
F.2d 872, 879 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders 
of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441–44; SEC v. Am. 
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965)). 
234 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 261, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6468. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 6436. 
237 Id. at 6473. 
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 embraced the Commis-
sion’s recommendations by requiring the court to confirm a con-
sensual plan that did not provide for distributions in accordance 
with the absolute priority rule.238 Moreover, Congress adopted the 
House amendment under which the absolute priority rule would 
no longer apply to dissenters in an accepting class.239 Congress in 
1978 thus rolled back two more aspects of the rule stated in Los 
Angeles Lumber. Thereafter: (1) a consensual plan accepted by 
majorities in all impaired classes was confirmable even if it did 
not satisfy the absolute priority rule; and (2) dissenters in an ac-
cepting class of any plan, whether consensual or cramdown, were 
not entitled to absolute priority.240 
G. 1986 and 2005—Congress Rolls Back the Absolute Priority Rule 
with Respect to Certain Family-Owned Businesses 
Congress further reduced the reach of the rule in 1986 by en-
acting chapter 12.241 Prior to enactment of chapter 12, the abso-
lute priority rule presented a formidable obstacle to bankrupt 
family farmers retaining their farms.242 The problem posed was 
simply that the family farmers’ ownership interest in the farm, or 
ownership of stock in the farm if the business was held and operated 
in corporate form, was junior to the senior interests of creditors.243 
Under the absolute priority rule, the debtors would need to pay 
all creditors in full if they were to continue to own their farm.244 
                                                                                                            
238 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1129(a), (b) (1978), 
92 Stat. 2549, 2635–36 (1978). 
239 Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
240 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939). The 
1977 House Report stated that an “important difference” from the rule in chap-
ter X was that the new bill “permits senior classes to take less than full pay-
ment, in order to expedite or insure the success of the reorganization.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-595 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6184. 
241 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, ch. 12, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088. 
242 H.R. CONFERENCE REPORT, BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, 
AND FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-958, at 48–50 
(1986) (Conf. Rep.).  
243 Id.  
244 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988), rev’g In re 
Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986). Ahlers is most often cited for the principle 
that sweat equity is not new value for the purpose of a new value exception to 
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The Supreme Court in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers 
confronted the issue in 1988, in a case filed by family farmers under 
chapter 11, prior to enactment of the new chapter 12.245 The Ahlers 
court unequivocally concluded that in chapter 11 there was “little 
doubt that a reorganization plan in which respondents retain[ed] 
an equity interest in the farm [was] contrary to the absolute pri-
ority rule.”246 
Under the new chapter 12, compliance with the absolute priority 
rule was not required.247 A plan was confirmable even over objec-
tions if it satisfied the best interest of creditors test, i.e., a creditor 
would receive at least what it would have received in a chapter 7 
liquidation, if the plan provided for the payment of the debtor’s 
disposable income to creditors over the 3-year (or longer) term of 
the plan.248 The debtor farmers could keep their farm even if the 
plan did not pay unsecured creditors in full.249 The Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005250 made 
chapter 12 applicable on the same terms to certain family-owned 
commercial fishing operations.251 
                                                                                                            
the absolute priority rule. The new value exception (though it has never been 
unequivocally embraced by the Supreme Court), permits confirmation of a cram-
down plan under which the debtor retains its equity ownership in exchange for 
new value notwithstanding that creditors are not paid in full. The Eighth Cir-
cuit had held that “a farmer’s efforts in operating and managing his farm,” i.e., 
his sweat equity, was new value. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 399, 402 (8th Cir. 
1986). The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, noting that Congress must also 
have agreed with its analysis, else Congress would not have recently passed the 
new chapter 12. See Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 202. 
245 Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 198.  
246 Id. at 202. 
247 See 11 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).  
248 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer 
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, sec. 255, § 1225, 100 Stat. 3090, 3105 (1986) 
(inserting the new chapter 12). See chapter 12 provisions section 1225(a)(4), 
the best interest of creditors requirement, and section 1225(b)(1)(B), the dis-
posable income requirement.  
249 Id. § 1228(b)–(c).  
250 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 109th Cong. (2005) (“BAPCPA”). 
251 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-8, § 1007, 119 Stat. 23, 187–88 (2005) (“BAPCPA”) (amending the 
Code to include 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(19A), 109(f)). 
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H. Summary—Congress Persistently and Severely Has Contracted 
the Absolute Priority Rule Since Its Judicial Expansion in Los 
Angeles Lumber 
The Supreme Court made three material determinations con-
struing section 77B in Los Angeles Lumber: first, “fair and equitable” 
meant “full or absolute priority” in a bankruptcy plan;252 second, 
the rule applied to reorganization plans, whether consensual such 
as the plan before the court in Los Angeles Lumber, or otherwise;253 
and third, the rule applied to each creditor.254 Subsequent decisions 
in the dozen years after Los Angeles Lumber extended the rule be-
yond corporate reorganizations, to several chapters of the Chandler 
Act which expressly required plans to be “fair and equitable.”255 
Congress over the last sixty years steadily and severely has 
limited the reach of the Los Angeles Lumber rule.256 In 1952, it 
rolled back the requirement of absolute priority for plans under 
chapters XI (arrangements) and XII (real estate arrangements), to 
which the courts had extended it.257 Congress by the same enact-
ment also expressly made the rule inapplicable in chapter XIII (wage 
earners’ plans).258 By so doing, Congress sharply contracted the 
reach of the first determination made by the Court in Los Angeles 
Lumber, i.e., that the “absolute or full priority” doctrine extended 
to all bankruptcy plans by virtue of the statutory requirement that 
a plan be “fair and equitable.”259 The years leading to the Code’s 
enactment in 1978 witnessed further criticisms of the rule, including 
from the Commission authorized by Congress to recommend changes 
to U.S. bankruptcy law.260 Congress in the 1978 Code made the 
rule inapplicable to the confirmation of a consensual plan and to dis-
senting creditors in an accepting class, even in a cramdown plan, 
                                                                                                            
252 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118, 122 (1939). 
253 Id. at 106, 107, 115. 
254 Id.  
255 See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 48, 52 Stat. 840, 863 (1938).  
256 See Bankruptcy Act, 1958 Amendments, Pub. L. 456, 66 Stat. 420, 421, 
437–38 (1958). 
257 Id. § 2(c). 
258 Id. § 54. 
259 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118, 122 (1939). 
260 See generally 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222. 
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completely negating the second and third determinations made by 
the Court in Los Angeles Lumber.261 Finally, in 1986 and then in 
2005, Congress reduced the applicability of the absolute priority 
rule again, excluding certain family businesses from its reach.262 
The absolute priority rule did not erode from creative lawyer-
ing against a stony legislative decree or a judiciary who side stepped 
the rule to achieve expedient outcomes. Rather, Congress chiseled 
away the rule over time to enable positive resolutions of failed 
businesses and individuals that did not require application of the 
absolute priority rule, yet were in the best interest of creditors. 
III. THE RESULTING LIMITED TEXTUAL REACH OF THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE CODE 
The absolute priority rule requires that senior claims are paid 
in full before junior claims receive anything, that junior claims 
are paid in full before equity holders receive anything, and that 
senior equity holders (such as preferred shareholders) are paid in 
full before junior equity holders (such as common shareholders) 
receive anything.263 
Some commentators have called the absolute priority rule “the 
cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory.”264 Others have 
described it as “central” to chapter 11 under the Code265 and to 
the “bankruptcy bargain.”266 Yet the reach of the absolute priority 
                                                                                                            
261 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). Indeed, the plan in Los Angeles Lumber would 
have been confirmed under the Code, because it was a consensual plan. See Los 
Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 109–10. Other statutory requirements for consensual 
plan confirmation continued to apply under the Code, in particular the “best interest 
of creditors test” of section 1129(a)(7) pursuant to which each dissenter must receive 
under the plan at least what it would receive in chapter 7. See § 1129(a)(7). 
262 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer 
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, sec. 255, § 1225, 100 Stat. 3090, 3110–11 
(1986); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-8, sec. 101, § 1007, 119 Stat. 23, 187–88 (2005).  
263 See § 1129(b).  
264 Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991). 
265 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 57 (6th ed. 2014).  
266 Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
9, 11 (1992). 
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rule under the current Code is surprisingly limited. The absolute 
priority rule does not pervade chapter 11 or the other chapters of 
the Code to the extent that many suggest. 
The text of the Code does not expressly require absolute priority 
with respect to all distributions in, or resolutions of, a bankruptcy 
case. Rather, the Code expressly limits the rule to two circum-
stances: (1) distributions to unsecured creditors and equity hold-
ers in a chapter 7 liquidation case, and (2) distributions to the 
holder of claims in a voting class that has rejected a chapter 11 
cramdown plan.267 
In chapter 11, the current Code does not require absolute pri-
ority for confirmation of a consensual plan.268 For confirmation of 
a cramdown plan, the rule applies only to the holders of claims or 
interests in a rejecting class of claims or interests.269 
Compliance with the rule is not required for the confirmation 
of plans under other chapters of the Code. Specifically, the rule does 
not apply in chapter 9 (adjustment of debts of a municipality),270 
chapter 12 (for family farmers and family fishermen),271 chapter 13 
(for individuals with regular income)272 or chapter 15 (for cross-
border cases).273 An analysis of the current Code’s text on a chapter-
by-chapter basis follows. 
                                                                                                            
267 See generally §§ 701–84, 1129.  
268 See § 1129(a). If all classes of claims and interests have accepted the plan 
under § 1129(a)(8), the absolute priority rule in § 1129(b) does not apply. 
§ 1129(a)(8). A plan must pay priority claims in full under § 1129(a), but even 
a dissenter in an accepting class of priority claims can be required to take de-
ferred payments, rather than payment in full on the effective date of the plan, 
while the plan pays junior claims and interests in full on the effective date. 
§ 1129(a)(9)(B)(i). “Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, consent can be given 
through a classwide vote of creditors.” Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, 
Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 738, 738 (1988) (“A single uncompromising creditor’s objection is 
not sufficient to prevent the participation of shareholders.”). 
269 See § 1129(a)(9). 
270 § 943.  
271 § 1225. 
272 § 1325. 
273 See generally §§ 1501–32 (demonstrating that nothing in chapter 15 au-
thorizes a United States bankruptcy court to impose the absolute priority rule 
on distributions). 
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A. Chapter 7 (Liquidation)274—The Absolute Priority Rule Applies 
The absolute priority rule applies, first, in chapter 7 liquida-
tion.275 Both individuals and most business organizations such as 
corporations are eligible to be a debtor in chapter 7.276 
Decisions and commentators often cite section 507 as the basis 
for the absolute priority rule, but the rule is not there. Section 507 
merely defines ten priorities of unsecured claims, in descending 
order of seniority and subordination from “first” to “tenth.”277 Sec-
tion 507 says nothing of secured claims.278 It also does not direct 
distributions to the holders of the listed unsecured priority 
claims.279 Section 507 does not refer at all to general unsecured 
claims or equity, and similarly says nothing of the place of those 
more substantial and numerous claims and interests in the dis-
tribution scheme applicable in chapter 7.280 
Rather, the distributional rules for chapter 7 begin with the 
state law and other nonbankruptcy law that determine liens and 
other interests in a debtor’s property and the recognition in deci-
sional law that such liens and interests generally remain in effect 
after the bankruptcy case has been filed.281 That rule is subject to 
                                                                                                            
274 Code chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15, discussed below, contain the Code 
provisions for six different types of bankruptcy cases. See §§ 701–1532. The 
reference, “Liquidation,” is the Code chapter heading for chapter 7. See id. The 
chapter headings for the other these six chapters are: “Chapter 9—Adjust-
ment of Debts of a Municipality”; “Chapter 11—Reorganization”; “Chapter 12—
Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with a Regular Annual 
Income”; “Chapter 13—Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular In-
come”; and “Chapter 15—Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases.” Id. 
275 See § 726(a).   
276 § 109(b). Notable exceptions are railroads, which are eligible to be debtors 
only under chapter 11, and insurance companies, banks, and certain other fi-
nancial institutions, which are subject to resolution under other federal and/or 
state insolvency laws. Id. 
277 See § 507. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 Id.  
281 “Property interests are created and defined by state law” in a bankruptcy 
case, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Butner v. United States. 440 U.S. 48, 
54–55 (1979) (1898 Act case). State law establishes the extent, validity, and priority 
of liens and other interests in a debtor’s property. Id. State law recordation 
acts, and related real property and contract law (such as that applicable to 
subordination agreements) determine which lien or other encumbrance has 
priority and which is subordinate. Id. Butner makes clear that the holder of a 
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Code section 506 that provides that a secured claim is not allowed 
beyond the value of the collateral securing it.282 Beyond this prin-
ciple, the rules for payment to holders of unsecured claims and equity 
holders in chapter 7 are set forth in Code section 726.283 The resulting 
distributional rules, in order of descending priority, are as follows: 
 
x First, a secured creditor is entitled to receive the value 
of its collateral, up to the amount of its claim secured 
by that collateral. If the secured creditor is under-
secured, i.e., the value of its collateral is less than the 
amount of its claim, then the amount of the claim in 
excess of the value of its collateral becomes a general 
unsecured claim pursuant to Code section 506(b).284 
x Second, if value remains in the debtor’s estate, pri-
ority unsecured claims in chapter 7 are paid “in the 
order specified in” section 507(a), such that holders 
of claims in each tranche are paid in full prior to any 
payment to the holders of claims in the next junior 
tranche or priority unsecured claims.285 
x Third, if value remains in the debtor’s estate, gen-
eral unsecured claims are paid.286 
x Finally, after all claims referred to in the prior par-
agraphs are fully paid, the remaining value is paid 
to the debtor.287 
                                                                                                            
prepetition lien should be “afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same pro-
tection he would have under state law had no bankruptcy ensued.” Id. at 49, 
54–56. The secured creditor must perfect its lien under state law, such as by 
filing a mortgage or financing statement or by obtaining a judgment lien. See 
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1993) (1978 Code case, 
following Butner). If the lien is not perfected it will be subject to avoidance under 
Code section 544. See § 544.  
282 See § 506(a). 
283 See generally § 726.  
284 See § 506(a). 
285 § 726(a)(1). When the music stops and the estate has insufficient value 
with which to pay in full a tranche of priority claims, or to pay in full the 
tranche of general unsecured claims after priority claims have been paid in 
full, the remaining value is distributed to the holders in that tranche on a pro 
rata basis. § 726(b). 
286 § 726(a)(2). 
287 § 726(a)(6). 
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The chapter 7 distributional rules, as pure as they are, do not 
extend to chapter 11 or to any other chapters of the Code. Code 
section 103(b) makes this clear.288 Section 726 is part of subchap-
ter II of chapter 7 of the Code.289 Section 103(b) unequivocally 
states that the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 7 apply only 
in chapter 7.290 
B. Chapter 9 (Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality)—The 
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply 
Chapter 9 applies to an insolvent municipality that “desires to 
effect a plan to adjust” its debts.291 Chapter 9 presents a peculiar 
situation and its text is frustratingly unclear.292 
Though chapter 9 incorporates section 1129(b) and thus the 
requirement that a cramdown plan be “fair and equitable,”293 
chapter 9 does not require absolute distributional priority, for two 
reasons. One is textual, and the other relates to the special nature 
of a municipality. 
First, chapter 9 does not require distributions to unsecured 
creditors per the priorities listed in section 507(a).294 None of 
those priorities listed other than administrative expense claims, 
which are a second priority claim under section 507(a)(2), apply 
in chapter 9 cases.295 The other priorities of section 507(a) simply 
do not apply to chapter 9.296 At least two of those priorities—the 
fourth regarding wages and salaries payable to employees, and the 
                                                                                                            
288 § 103(b). 
289 See generally § 726.  
290 § 103(b). 
291 § 109(c)(4). Specifically, § 109(c) makes §§ 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6), 
1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10), 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), and 1129(b)(2)(B) (and a number 
of other sections that are not part of section 1129) applicable in a chapter 9 
case. See also In re Stephens, 704 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that absent clear indication, amendments to the Bankruptcy Code do not im-
pliedly exempt debtors from absolute priority rule). 
292 See §§ 901–46. 
293 § 901(a). Code section 103(f) states that, except as provided in section 
901, only the provisions of chapter 1 (general provisions) and chapter 9 (ad-
justment of debts of a municipality) apply in a chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy 
case. § 103(f). 
294 § 901(a). 
295 Id. 
296 See id. 
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fifth, regarding contributions to an employee benefit plan—would 
have clear application in chapter 9 and to a cramdown plan pro-
posed in the case but for the exclusionary text of section 901(a).297 
The requirements for chapter 9 plan confirmation set forth in 
section 943(b) are consistent with this analysis. Under section 
943(b)(5), the plan must provide only for payment of section 
507(a)(2) administrative expense claims.298 Chapter 9 imposes no 
obligation on the municipal debtor to adhere to the absolute pri-
ority rule with respect to any other priority unsecured claims set 
forth in of section 507(a).299 
Second, a municipality has no stockholders or other owners who 
would be subject to the absolute priority rule. Thus, by case law in 
a municipal debt adjustment case, the “fair and equitable” require-
ment does not prevent the municipality from retaining its prop-
erty and continuing to operate even if the plan does not provide for 
full payment to creditors.300 A chapter 9 plan must only pay creditors 
“all that they ‘can reasonably expect in the circumstances.’”301 
The bankruptcy court in In re City of Detroit recently stated 
the rule: “because municipalities have no junior class of share-
holders, the absolute priority rule provides unsecured creditors with 
no protection.”302 Instead, the plan must embody “a fair and equi-
table bargain openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, how-
ever subtle.”303 The court in City of Detroit found that no viable 
alternatives to the plan would solve the City’s problems and at the 
same time pay more to the dissenting creditors.304 The cramdown 
plan thus was “fair and equitable,” and the court confirmed it.305 
                                                                                                            
297 See § 507(a)(4) (on wage claims); § 507(a)(5) (on employee benefit contri-
bution claims); see also § 507(a)(8) (unsecured claims of governmental units). 
298 § 943(b)(5). 
299 See §§ 901(a), 943(b)(5). 
300 COLLIER, supra note 209, ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(A). 
301 Id. ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(B) (citing Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 
628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942)). 
302 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (citing 
In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 458 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999)). 
303 Id. at 210 (citing Am. United Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 
311 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1940)). 
304 Id. at 262. 
305 Id. 
 
488 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 
In sum, confirmation of a chapter 9 plan does not require com-
pliance with the absolute priority rule.306 Only the second priority 
listed in section 507 (for administrative expense claims) applies 
at all. And though the Code’s text requires the plan to be “fair and 
equitable,” decisional law construes that term in chapter 9 to 
mean an equitable process by which the bankruptcy court weighs 
the benefits of confirmation to the citizenry and the creditor body 
as a whole against the harm to dissenting creditors. 
C. Chapter 11 (Reorganization)—The Absolute Priority Rule 
Applies to Holders in Dissenting Class in a Cramdown Plan; The 
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual Plans or to 
Dissenters in Any Accepting Class; The Best Interest of Creditors 
Test Protects Dissenters 
Chapter 11 does not contain a provision corresponding to sec-
tion 726.307 No section in chapter 11 requires distributions in a 
chapter 11 case to accord with the priorities set forth in section 
507 in all cases. Instead, the absolute priority rule applies only to 
a cramdown plan and then only to the holders of claims in a voting 
class that has rejected a plan.308 
The proponent of the chapter 11 plan (most often the debtor in 
possession) designates the classes of claims and interests in the 
proposed plan.309 Voting for or against the plan is by class.310 A 
class of claims generally accepts the plan if “at least two-thirds in 
amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims 
of such class held by creditors ... have accepted or rejected such 
plan.”311 A class of interests, i.e., equity holders, generally accepts 
                                                                                                            
306 See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012); see also § 943(b)(5); City of Detroit, 524 
B.R. at 260 (citing Corcoran, 233 B.R. at 458). 
307 §§ 1101–74. 
308 § 1129(a)–(b). 
309 § 1123(a)(1). The debtor in possession or other party in interest that pro-
poses the plan has some leeway in classifying claims and interests under the 
proposed plan, subject to section 1122. That section provides generally that “a 
plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or 
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.” 
§ 1122(a). 
310 See § 1126(c)–(d). 
311 § 1126(c). 
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the plan if “such plan has been accepted by holders of such inter-
ests ... that hold at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed in-
terests of such class held by holders of such interests ... that have 
accepted or rejected such plan.”312 
A “cramdown” plan in chapter 11 is a plan that one or more 
impaired classes of claims voted to reject, but that at least one 
impaired class of claims voted to accept.313 A “consensual” plan is 
a plan that all impaired classes of claims and interests have voted to 
accept.314 Both cramdown plans and consensual plans are con-
firmable by the bankruptcy court in a chapter 11 case.315 The pri-
mary difference is that a cramdown plan is confirmable only if the 
plan follows the absolute priority rule with respect to each holder 
in the dissenting class or classes.316 The absolute priority rule does 
not apply, though, to the holders of claims in a consensual plan, or to 
the dissenters in a voting class that has accepted a cramdown plan.317 
1. The Absolute Priority Rule Applies to Holders in a Dissenting 
Class in a Cramdown Plan 
The absolute priority rule applies in chapter 11 only to a cram-
down plan. The court may confirm a cramdown plan notwithstanding 
the negative vote of a dissenting class, but only if the plan satis-
fies the absolute priority rule with respect to the holders in the 
dissenting class.318 
The rule in chapter 11 applies only to the holders of claims and 
interests in a class that has voted against the plan, as follows: 
 
x With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan 
must provide that each holder within the class will 
                                                                                                            
312 § 1126(d). 
313 § 1129(a)(10), (b). 
314 § 1129(a)(8). A claim or interest generally is “impaired” unless it “leaves 
unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or 
interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest,” i.e., an “impaired” class 
of claims or interests essentially is a class the members of which will receive 
less than they would be entitled to outside of the bankruptcy. § 1124(1). If, for 
example, each of the holders in a class of unsecured creditors will be paid 7 
percent rather than 100 percent of its allowed claim, then the class is impaired. 
315 § 1129(a)(1)–(9), (11)–(16). 
316 § 1129(b)(1). 
317 § 1129(a)–(b). 
318 § 1129(b)(1). 
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receive the equivalent of its allowed secured claim, 
i.e., the value of its collateral up to the amount of its 
claim;319 
x With respect to a class of unsecured claims, the plan 
must provide that each holder within the class will 
receive or retain value on the plan effective date equal 
to the allowed amount of such claim, or the holder of 
a junior claim or interest will receive nothing under 
the plan;320 and 
x With respect to a class of interests (i.e., shares or 
other equity), the plan must provide that each holder 
will receive the liquidation, redemption or actual value 
of such interest, or the holder of a junior interest will 
receive nothing under the plan.321 
 
The gist of section 1129(b) as it applies to a cramdown plan is 
the essence of the absolute priority rule. Unless each holder in the 
senior rejecting class of, say, unsecured claims will receive the full 
value of its claim under the plan, then the plan may not distribute 
anything at all to any junior stakeholder on account of its claim 
or interest.322 The rule applies to a cramdown plan even if all of 
the other requirements for confirmation set forth in section 
1129(a) have been satisfied.323 The simple reason is that the ab-
solute priority rule set forth in section 1129(b) required for a 
cramdown plan has not been satisfied. 
2. The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual 
Plans or to Dissenters in Any Accepting Class in a 
Cramdown Plan 
The absolute priority rule does not apply, though, to a consen-
sual chapter 11 plan. Section 1129(b) expressly provides that the 
absolute priority rule applies only if one or more impaired classes 
                                                                                                            
319 § 1129(b)(2)(A) (setting forth the various ways in which this may be ac-
complished under the plan). 
320 § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
321 § 1129(b)(2)(C). 
322 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6370. 
323 § 1129(b)(1). 
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of claims or interests has voted against the plan, and thus the 
plan fails to satisfy section 1129(a)(8).324 If all impaired classes of 
claims and interests designated in the plan have voted to accept 
under section 1129(a)(8), then the plan is a consensual plan and 
section 1129(b) does not apply.325 The bankruptcy court “shall 
confirm” a consensual plan that complies with the other require-
ments of section 1129(a), notwithstanding that it does not comply 
with the absolute priority rule.326 
Consider the following illustration. The Code provides that the 
court shall confirm a consensual plan that pays pennies on the 
dollar to the holders of classes of general unsecured claims and 
gives all of the equity in the reorganized debtor to existing share-
holders on account of their interests. If each voting class of claims 
and interests has accepted the plan by the requisite majorities in 
accordance with section 1129(a)(8), then the absolute priority rule 
of section 1129(b) does not apply and the court shall confirm the 
plan if it satisfies the other conditions of section 1129(a), even over 
the dissenters’ votes and objections. 
Even in a cramdown plan, the absolute priority rule only ap-
plies to the holders in the rejecting class.327 The requirement that 
a cramdown plan must be “fair and equitable” by satisfying the 
absolute priority rule applies only to “each class of claims or in-
terests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”328 
The dissenters within any accepting class under a cramdown plan 
may not avail themselves of the rule. 
Consider a cramdown plan in which two classes of unsecured 
claims are impaired and entitled to vote. One unsecured class has 
accepted and the other unsecured class has rejected the plan. The 
plan violates the absolute priority rule because it will pay pennies 
on the dollar to the holders in each class of unsecured claims and the 
shareholders in the old company will own the reorganized company. 
The absolute priority rule applies, but only to the dissenting class, 
                                                                                                            
324 § 1129(a)(8), (b)(1). 
325 Courts have split since the 2005 BAPCPA amendments regarding whether 
the absolute priority rule applies to an individual’s chapter 11 plan. See In re 
Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2012). This question is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
326 § 1129(a), (b)(1). 
327 § 1129(b)(1). 
328 Id. (emphasis added). 
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because it “is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”329 
Section 1129(b) does not require compliance with the rule with 
respect to holders in the accepting class, even if they dissented and 
voted against the plan. 
Moreover, even under the requirements for confirmation of a 
chapter 11 plan, section 507 does not always apply. Under both a 
consensual plan and a cramdown plan, the majority in a consent-
ing class of section 507 priority unsecured employee wage or ben-
efit plan claims, agricultural supplier claims, or consumer deposit 
claims can bind dissenters within that class to accept deferred 
payments.330 The court may confirm a plan even if it provides for 
the deferral of payments to holders of priority claims in those classes 
until after full payment of lower priority claims, and even after the 
debtor has received its discharge and the court has closed the case.331 
3. The Best Interest of Creditors Test Protects Dissenters in 
Chapter 11 
The limited reach of the absolute priority rule in chapter 11 
does not mean that dissenting stakeholders are without protec-
tion. The “best interest of creditors” test, set forth in section 
1129(a)(7), requires that each holder of a claim or interest that 
has voted against the plan will receive at least as much as it 
would receive if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7.332 If 
                                                                                                            
329 Id. (emphasis added). 
330 § 507(a)(1), (4)–(7); § 1129(a)(9)(B); see TABB, supra note 96, at 733. 
331 The bankruptcy court normally closes a chapter 11 case in which a plan 
was confirmed by entry of a final decree under Rule 3022 once distributions 
under the plan have commenced. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022 advisory comm. 
n. (“[F]inal decree closing a chapter 11 case should not be delayed solely be-
cause the payments required by the plan have not been completed.”). Closing 
a case after plan confirmation is not the same thing as dismissing the case 
under section 1112, grounds for which include the failure to confirm or consum-
mate a plan. § 1112(b)(4)(M) (emphasis added). 
332 § 1129(a)(7)(A)–(B). The requirement of section 1129(a)(7)(A) is consis-
tently referred to as the “best interest of creditors test,” though the Code does 
not use that term. The designation predates the Code. See H.R. COMM. ON 
JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 400 (1978), 
as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6356; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 126 (1978), 
as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913. The House Report in its section-
by-section analysis stated that section 1129(a)(7) “incorporates the former ‘best 
interest of creditors’ test found in chapter 11, but spells out precisely what is 
intended.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
 
2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 493 
a dissenting creditor will receive less under the plan, then bank-
ruptcy court may not confirm it. 
In sum, the absolute priority rule is far from absolute in chap-
ter 11. Chapter 11 does not require that distributions in chapter 
11 must be made in accordance with the priorities listed in section 
507 or otherwise must adhere to the absolute priority rule with 
respect to all of the holders of claims or interests. The rule is lim-
ited to the holders in a class that has voted against the plan. 
D. Chapter 12 (Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or 
Fisherman with a Regular Annual Income)—The Absolute 
Priority Rule Does Not Apply 
The absolute priority rule does not apply to chapter 12333 or to 
a chapter 12 plan.334 The Code requires a chapter 12 debtor to file 
a plan within ninety days.335 The plan is subject to confirmation 
by the bankruptcy court, but there is no voting by holders of claims 
or interests.336 
Most significantly, a farmer or family fisherman may keep the 
farm or fishing business even if the plan does not pay creditors in 
full.337 If the debtor’s corporation or limited partnership owns the 
farm or commercial fishing operation, then the debtor may retain 
her corporate shares or partnership interests even if the plan does 
not pay the debtor’s creditors in full.338 
                                                                                                            
5963, 6368; see also Markell, supra note 264, at 88 (explaining the legislative 
compromise that resulted in the requirement that a plan satisfy the best inter-
est of creditors test rather than the absolute priority rule to safeguard the in-
terests of dissenting creditors and shareholders in chapter 11). The directive 
that that the bankruptcy court act “in the best interests of creditors and the 
estate” in determining whether to convert or dismiss under section 1112(b) is 
different from the “best interest of creditors” test of section 1129(a)(7)(A) which, 
as set forth above, is a legal term of art.   
333 See Chapter 12 and Family Farm Bankruptcies, FINDLAW (Dec. 21, 
2016), http://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/chapter-12-and-family-farm-bank 
ruptcies.html [https://perma.cc/W3L9-CVVZ] (noting the absence of any refer-
ence to the absolute priority rule in chapter 12); §§ 1201–31. 
334 §§ 1222, 1225. 
335 § 1221. 
336 § 1325(a). 
337 TABB, supra note 96, at 113. 
338 § 1222(a)(4)–(d); see also TABB, supra note 96, at 113 (“[C]hapter 12 rules 
are very different from the chapter 11 requirements in a number of ways that 
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The chapter 12 plan also may pay unsecured priority claims 
“in deferred cash payments,” temporally may pay priority claims 
out of the order set forth in section 507, and may pay priority 
claims prior to paying general unsecured claims.339 Further, not-
withstanding the priority given to tax claims under section 507, 
if a priority claim is “owed to a governmental unit that arises as a 
result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any 
farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation,” then it is “treated 
as [a general] unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority.”340 
In sum, the absolute priority rule does not apply in chapter 12. 
First, the debtor may retain its farm or fishing business even if it 
does not pay the holders of claims in full. Second, chapter 12 permits 
the debtor to pay priority unsecured claims over time, even if it 
pays unsecured claims of lower priority in full on an earlier date. 
E.  Chapter 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular 
Income)—The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply 
The absolute priority rule similarly does not apply to chapter 
13,341 or to a chapter 13 plan.342 A chapter 13 debtor shall file a 
plan that provides for a three- to five-year payout to creditors.343 
The plan is subject to confirmation by the bankruptcy court but, 
like chapter 12, there is no plan voting.344 
                                                                                                            
greatly benefit the farmer or fisherman debtor. For example, the ‘absolute pri-
ority’ rule in chapter 11, which prohibits the debtor from retaining any prop-
erty (e.g., the farm) over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors unless 
that class is paid in full, § 1129(b)(2)(B), is not included in chapter 12.”); Ayer, 
supra note 143, at 1020 (“In each case [of chapters 12 and 13], the Code permits 
the debtor to retain property that might otherwise go to creditors, even where 
creditors are not paid in full.”). A “family farmer” and a “family fisherman” 
with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter 12. § 109(f). Each 
definition includes a family-owned corporation or limited partnership through 
which the family conducts the operation. § 101(18)(B), (19A)(B). 
339 §§ 507(a)(8), 1222(a)(2)(A), 1225(a)(1), (4). 
340 § 1222(a)(2)(A). 
341 See §§ 1301–30. 
342 See §§ 1322, 1325. 
343 § 1325(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii); see also Chapter 13—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics 
/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/Y7QY-Y6K9]. 
344 See § 1325; see also Chapter 13—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 343. 
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Section 1325(b) provides that the bankruptcy court shall confirm 
a plan if the debtor’s projected disposable income “will be applied 
to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.”345 The 
debtor may retain his non-exempt property even if he does not 
pay unsecured creditors in full,346 in clear contradiction of the re-
sult that would occur if the absolute priority rule applied. Though 
a chapter 13 plan must provide for full payment of all section 507 
priority claims in deferred cash payments over the term of the 
three- to five-year plan,347 chapter 13 does not require the payment 
of senior priority unsecured claims prior to payment of junior pri-
ority unsecured claims.348 
F. Chapter 15 (Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases)—The 
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply 
Congress enacted chapter 15 in 2005 as part of BAPCPA.349 
Chapter 15 applies to international bankruptcies,350 when a “for-
eign court or foreign representative in connection with a foreign 
[insolvency] proceeding” seeks assistance in the United States, or 
“assistance is sought in a foreign country in connection with a 
case under” the Bankruptcy Code.351 
The absolute priority rule does not apply in chapter 15. Code 
section 103(a), which enumerates the Code provisions applicable 
to chapter 15, does not include section 507 (listing the unsecured 
priority claims), section 726 (providing for distributional priorities 
in chapter 7), or section 1129(b) (setting forth the absolute prior-
ity for purposes of confirmation of a cramdown plan).352 Nothing 
                                                                                                            
345 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
346 Id. § 1325(b) (emphasis added); see Ayer, supra note 143, at 1020; TABB, 
supra note 96, at 1202, 1246 (“[C]lasses of unsecured creditors in chapter 13 
cannot invoke the absolute priority rule, meaning that the debtor is free to 
retain her property and any equity interests therein.”). 
347 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). 
348 Though the plan must pay priority unsecured claims in full over the life 
of the plan, there is “no additional requirement that those claims be paid tem-
porally in the order of their priority. For example, the debtor could provide that 
all eighth priority tax claims be paid first.”  TABB, supra note 96, at 1227. 
349 See id. at 118–19. 
350 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501. 
351 Id. § 1501(b)(1)–(2). 
352 Id. §§ 103(a), 507(a), 726(a), 1129(b). 
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in chapter 15 authorizes a United States bankruptcy court to im-
pose the absolute priority rule on distributions in chapter 15. 
G.  Summary—The Absolute Priority Rule and the Bankruptcy 
Code 
The current text of the Code gives the absolute priority rule a 
surprisingly narrow scope. The rule applies unequivocally in chapter 
7. Outside of that chapter, the rule’s reach is weak. 
The restriction against a debtor or its shareholders from re-
taining their ownership interests until all senior claims are paid 
in full does not apply at all in chapters 9, 12, 13 or 15. Distributions 
to priority unsecured claimants also have a limited application 
under most chapters of the Code. Payments per those priorities: 
(1) are not required at all in chapter 9 (except that administrative 
expense claims must be paid), (2) are altered with respect to some 
tax priorities and also may be temporally reordered in chapter 12, 
(3) may be temporally reordered in 13, and (4) are not required in 
chapter 15.353 
In chapter 11, the absolute priority rule has no application to 
a consensual plan that has been accepted by the requisite major-
ities in each impaired class.354 A consensual plan may permit eq-
uity to retain ownership of the reorganized debtor even if it does 
not pay creditors in full; under an approved plan equity may also 
pay priority unsecured claims on a deferred basis, after payment 
of lower priority claims, even following the debtor’s discharge and 
the closing of the case. The absolute priority rule applies only to 
a chapter 11 cramdown plan and then, only to the holders of 
claims or interests in a rejecting class.355 Dissenters in accepting 
classes, whether under a consensual plan or a cramdown plan, 
cannot invoke the rule.356 Other, more pervasive rules—including 
the best interest of creditors test and the other requirements of 
section 1129(a)—protect those dissenters.357 
In sum, the absolute priority rule under the text of today’s 
Code is more a special than a general rule. Its limited scope did not 
result from legislative accident, clever lawyering, or creative judging. 
                                                                                                            
353 See supra Part III.B. 
354 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). 
355 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
356 TABB, supra note 96, at 733. 
357 See supra Part III.C.3. 
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Rather, Congress consistently and deliberately has limited the 
reach of the rule. 
IV. SETTLEMENTS AND COMPROMISES UNDER THE CODE 
Bankruptcy Rule 9019 authorizes a bankruptcy court to ap-
prove a settlement or compromise.358 The Rule provides that, “af-
ter notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or 
settlement.”359 Nothing in the text of the current Code or Rules 
expressly requires that settlements outside of a plan adhere to 
the absolute priority rule or provide other criteria for the approval 
of a compromise or settlement. Rather, Congress has left the de-
velopment of the rules for approval of settlements to the courts. 
A. Settlements and Compromises Under TMT 
The bankruptcy case that set the standard for court approval 
of a settlement is Protective Committee for Independent Stock-
holders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson (“TMT ”).360 TMT 
was a chapter X corporate reorganization case under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.361 
The Chandler Act, unlike the Code, contained an express pro-
vision regarding settlements.362 Section 27 of the Act authorized 
the receiver or trustee, with the approval of the court, to “compromise 
any … controversy arising in the administration of the estate 
upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest of the estate.”363 
The Supreme Court’s General Order 33 also governed approvals 
                                                                                                            
358 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (2012). 
359 Id. 9019(a). 
360 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 418, 424 (1968). 
361 Id. at 418. Justice White wrote for a 5–3 majority in TMT. The dissent 
said nothing of the standard for approval of a settlement outside of a plan. The 
dissent, instead, considered that “the only question which could be thought 
even remotely to justify” the grant of certiorari was “whether the trustee, by 
virtue of his office, was as a matter of law disqualified from being selected as 
president of the reorganized company,” and would have dismissed the writ of 
certiorari on the ground that it was improvidently granted. Id. at 454 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
362 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938); 2 MODERN 
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL: LAW AND PRACTICE 1476 (1966). 
363 See MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 362, at 1476. 
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of settlements when TMT was decided in 1968.364 General Order 
33 required the receiver, trustee, or debtor in possession who was 
seeking approval of the compromise to set forth the reasons why 
it was “proper and for the best interest of the estate that the con-
troversy should be settled.”365 Neither section 27 nor General Or-
der 33 expressly required a settlement to be “fair and equitable” or to 
comply with the absolute priority rule. 
The Court in TMT stated that it was necessary for it to consider 
only two questions: whether it was error to affirm, first, “approval 
of compromises of substantial claims against the debtor,” and, 
second, the “District Court’s judgment that the debtor was insol-
vent, when that judgment was rendered without considering the 
future estimated earnings of the reorganized company.”366 Two 
settlements were at issue. 
The first claim settled in TMT was in the face amount of 
$330,000, though the holders of the claim had paid $280,500 for 
it.367 Preferred ship mortgages against the debtor’s vessels alleg-
edly secured the claim.368 The trustee proposed to settle the claim 
for $280,500, payable in installments with interest.369 The trustee 
proposed the settlement notwithstanding that the trustee’s own 
report had concluded that the holders of the preferred ship mort-
gages, who were insiders, “had diverted corporate opportunities 
through the flagrant abuse of their control, fiduciary or inside po-
sitions, and should be made to account for the profits they had 
made.”370 Moreover, at the time the preferred ship mortgages 
were executed, the insiders “were in a position to dictate terms 
which TMT would be forced to accept.”371 
                                                                                                            
364 Id. 
365 Chandler Act of 1938, § 27; see also MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra 
note 362, at 1476–77. Rule 919, which replaced General Order 33 in the mid-
1970s prior to enactment of the Code, said simply that “the court may approve a 
compromise or settlement” on notice and a hearing. MODERN BANKRUPTCY 
MANUAL, supra note 362, at 173. Rule 919 was strikingly similar to the present 
Rule 9019, and provided that “after hearing on notice to the creditors as pro-
vided in Rule 203(a) and to such other persons as the court may designate, the 
court may approve a compromise or settlement.” Id.  
366 TMT, 390 U.S. at 423 (1938). 
367 Id. at 425. 
368 Id. at 419. 
369 Id. at 426. 
370 Id. at 427. 
371 Id.  
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The second claim settled was in the face amount of $1.6 mil-
lion.372 Maritime liens against the debtor’s vessels allegedly secured 
about $600,000 of the claim, though there were material ques-
tions regarding the validity of the liens.373 The trustee proposed 
to allow this $1.6 million claim in full as a general unsecured 
claim, and to issue common stock in the reorganized debtor to the 
holder of the claim.374 
The district court approved both settlements.375 The court of 
appeals affirmed, emphasizing that the “litigation must at long 
last be brought to an end” and that it reviewed the trial judge’s 
determination for abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous deter-
minations.376 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.377 
Compromises are “‘a normal part of the process of reorganization’” 
wrote Justice White.378 He continued, “In administering reorgani-
zation proceedings in an economical and practical manner it will 
often be wise to arrange the settlement of claims as to which there 
are substantial and reasonable doubts.”379 
Yet, it remained “essential that every important determination 
in reorganization proceedings receive the ‘informed, independent 
judgment’ of the bankruptcy court.”380 The Court noted that the 
requirement that a chapter X plan be “‘fair and equitable’” applied 
to “compromises just as to other aspects of reorganizations.”381 A 
court could not have an “informed and independent judgment as 
to whether a proposed compromise [was] fair and equitable until 
the bankruptcy judge ha[d] apprised himself of all facts necessary 
for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ulti-
mate success should the claim be litigated.”382 This required the 
judge to “form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and 
                                                                                                            
372 Id. at 425. 
373 Id.  
374 Id. at 420. 
375 Id. at 416. 
376 Id. 
377 Id. at 418. 
378 Id. at 424 (citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 
130 (1939)). 
379 Id.  
380 Id. (citing Nat’l Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 436 (1933)). 
381 Id. 
382 Id.  
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likely duration of such litigation, the possible difficulties of col-
lecting on any judgment which might be obtained, and all other 
factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the 
proposed compromise.”383 Basic to this process was “the need to 
compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of 
litigation.”384 The Court said nothing of the absolute priority rule 
in connection with the standard for court approval of a settlement. 
The Court found the proceedings below lacking. The bankruptcy 
court had tagged all the bases in a statement that the Supreme 
Court quoted at length.385 The bankruptcy court, though, had 
merely adopted the assertions of the trustee’s counsel: the com-
promise was the best available; the prospect of material reduc-
tions of the claims did not warrant extensive litigation, and the 
likelihood of recoveries against the claimants beyond the amounts 
of their claims was too remote for serious consideration.386 The alter-
native to approval of the compromises was extensive litigation at 
heavy expense and “unnecessary delay in reorganization contrary 
to the intent and purpose of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.”387 
The bankruptcy court’s error was that it had accepted “the 
bald conclusions of the trustee” without referring to any of the 
objections filed or to the substantial facts in the record that cast 
doubt upon the trustee’s claims.388 The bankruptcy court had casu-
ally approved the settlements “despite the fact that the trustee 
had once concluded that the [ship’s] mortgage was null and void 
and that TMT had sizeable setoffs against its holders.”389 The 
trustee had once sought reference of the $1.6 million ship mort-
gage claim to a special master for investigation, and the trustee 
“had never placed on the record any of the facts of his subsequent 
investigation and had never provided any explanation of why he 
had completely reversed his field on these claims.”390 Though the 
bankruptcy court was understandably eager to end the protracted 
proceedings, there was no adequate explanation for the trustee’s 
                                                                                                            
383 Id.  
384 Id. at 425. 
385 Id. at 432–34. 
386 Id.  
387 Id. at 432–33. 
388 Id. at 433. 
389 Id.  
390 Id. at 433–34. 
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“cursory, conclusory recommendation of these ‘compromises,’ or 
the perfunctory, almost offhand, manner in which the court ac-
cepted that recommendation.”391 
It “would without question have been justifiable” to approve 
the settlements if the bankruptcy court’s statement 
had been the result of an adequate and intelligent considera-
tion of the merits of the claims, the difficulties of pursuing 
them, the potential harm to the debtor’s estate caused by delay, 
and the fairness of the terms of settlement .... It [was] essential, 
however, that a reviewing court have some basis for distin-
guishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a 
comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere 
boilerplate approval phrased in appropriate language but un-
supported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.392 
The bankruptcy court had provided no explanation of how it 
had evaluated the strengths or weaknesses of the debtor’s causes 
of action or the probable outcomes of the litigation and had not 
even offered an “educated estimate of the complexity, expense, 
and likely duration of the litigation.”393 
In the Supreme Court’s view, the court of appeals had done no 
better, dealing with the compromises “in five sentences,” focusing 
mostly on the fact that the committee and the SEC were the only 
objectors.394 The Supreme Court held that it was error for the 
bankruptcy court to approve the settlements and for the court of 
appeals to affirm, and reversed.395 
The TMT Court stated that a settlement must be “fair and eq-
uitable” for a court to approve it.396 It used the term “fair and eq-
uitable” for settlement approval to mean that a court must engage 
in a sufficiently thorough analysis of the claim being settled; any 
counterclaim that the estate might have against the claimant; 
and the costs, risks, and benefits of pursuing the litigation com-
pared with the terms of the settlement.397 The Court answered 
                                                                                                            
391 Id. at 434. 
392 Id. 
393 Id.  
394 Id. at 416. 
395 Id. at 418. 
396 Id. at 424–25. 
397 Id. 
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the first question—whether it was error for the district court to 
approve the settlements—on consideration only of the bankruptcy 
court’s inadequate examination of the “fairness of the terms of 
compromise” and without any consideration of whether the set-
tlement was at variance with the absolute priority rule.398 The 
Court cited three courts of appeals cases in support of its holding 
regarding approval of a compromise that similarly said nothing of 
the absolute priority rule.399 
Justice White, the authoring judge, referred to the absolute prior-
ity rule only when he turned to the second question that he had 
framed at the outset: Whether it was error to affirm the bankruptcy 
court’s judgment that the debtor was insolvent for the purposes 
of plan confirmation. Justice White determined that the district 
court’s determination of insolvency “was not made in accordance 
with the proper standards of valuation,” and, thus, equity might 
still be in the money.400 Confirmation of a plan that excluded 
shareholders, thus, could not stand.401 
In sum, Congress in section 27 of the Chandler Act authorized 
a bankruptcy court to approve a compromise that was in the best 
interest of the bankruptcy estate.402 Neither section 27 nor Gen-
eral Order 33 required that a settlement conform to an absolute 
                                                                                                            
398 Id. at 434–35, 440. 
399 Id. at 424 (citing Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1961); In re 
Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 196 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1952); Conway v. Silesian-
American Corp., 186 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950)). Other pre-Code circuit court 
cases, not cited by the court in TMT, had approved settlements or compromises 
without requiring compliance with the absolute priority rule and had required 
instead that the settlement or compromise be in the best interest of creditors 
per section 27 of the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g., Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. 
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 190 F.2d 305, 307–08 (2d Cir. 1951) (concerning 
the Railroad Reorganization Act—a court may approve a compromise if it is 
fair and in the best interest of the estate, and the order can be reversed only 
on a clear showing of an abuse of discretion); Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. v. 
Willson, 178 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1949) (filing under chapter X, citing cases); 
Fernow v. Gubser, 136 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1943) (involving 77B corporate 
reorganization, enforcing no requirement that settlement comply with the ab-
solute priority rule; instead: “The approval of a compromise of this kind is ad-
dressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and its action thereon will 
not be disturbed on appeal except in case of abuse of such discretion.”). 
400 TMT, 390 U.S. at 441. 
401 Id. 
402 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938). 
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priority rule or even that it be “fair and equitable.”403 Though the 
trustee reached the settlements in TMT in contemplation of a 
plan of reorganization, the Court did not review the settlements 
in terms of the absolute priority rule.404 It exhaustively consid-
ered instead whether the lower courts had rigorously examined 
the risks and rewards of continuing the litigation as opposed to 
approving the settlements.405 
The Supreme Court in TMT did not extend the absolute prior-
ity rule to bankruptcy settlements—even those made in contem-
plation of a plan. Justice White of course used the term “fair and 
equitable” in the first part of his TMT opinion in which he stated 
the standard for approval of a compromise.406 Nowhere, did he 
imply, though, that for such purposes the term was synonymous 
with absolute distributional priority. This is not surprising. The 
Bankruptcy Act used the term “fair and equitable” in several con-
texts having nothing to do with absolute priority.407 Only for confir-
mation of a chapter X plan did the term mean absolute priority, and 
not by express statutory language, but only by Justice Douglas’s 
holding in Los Angeles Lumber, the reach of which Congress al-
ready had severely limited. Post-TMT, pre-Code cases also did not 
require that compromises comply with the absolute priority rule 
in chapter X or under the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, 
those chapters of the Bankruptcy Act to which the absolute prior-
ity rule still pertained after 1952.408 
                                                                                                            
403 Id.; see also MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 362, at 1476–77. 
404 See TMT, 390 U.S. at 424–41. 
405 Id. at 433–35, 440–41. 
406 Id. at 424. 
407 See, e.g., Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 48(f)–(g), 52 Stat. 840, 862–63 
(1938) (noting that compensation of marshal, receiver, or trustee under a con-
firmed arrangement or plan of reorganization is required to be “fair and equi-
table”); id. § 863 (explaining that a court may allow a claim against the debtor 
that the claimant assigns to a third party in an amount that it determines to 
be “fair and equitable,” upon consideration of the amount of the claim, the cir-
cumstances of the assignment, and the consideration paid for the assignment 
of the claim); id. § 216(12) (holding that provisions of plan shall provide for a 
“fair and equitable” distribution of voting powers among the shareholders of 
the reorganized debtor). 
408 See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 642 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (see 
586 F.2d 241, 243, 246 for the court’s affirming transfer of the proceeding from 
chapter XI to X); In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980) 
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B. Settlements and Compromises Under the Bankruptcy Code 
The Code, unlike section 27 of the Chandler Act, said nothing 
of a bankruptcy court’s settlement authority. Rule 9019, which 
contains such authority, states only that, “after notice and a hear-
ing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”409 
Since the code became effective in 1978, the circuit courts have 
continued to apply the TMT risk-benefit standard to decide 
whether to approve a settlement, both in chapter 11 and chapter 7 
bankruptcy cases—without any requirement settlements adhere 
to the absolute priority rule410—as well as settlement outside of 
                                                                                                            
(chapter X); In re Wonderbowl, Inc., 515 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding 
under chapter X with no consideration of absolute priority rule: “trustee was 
fully empowered, with court approval, … to compromise within or without a 
reorganization plan.”), cert. denied, Fallon v. Jonas, 423 U.S. 869 (1975). Even 
in cases in which approval of a compromise was in connection with a plan, the 
courts flexibly applied the absolute priority rule to the resolution of the case or 
applied the TMT factors without even considering the rule. See, e.g., In re Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1127, 1146–48 (3d Cir. 1979) (concerning the Rail-
road Reorganization Act section 77, alluding to the “relativity” inherent in the 
absolute priority rule and declining “to adopt a mechanical application of any 
of the embellishments, clarifications, extensions, derivatives or off-shoots of 
the rule” which were “so strenuously urged by the appellants”); In re Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1113–14 (3d Cir. 1979) (concerning the Railroad Re-
organization Act section 77: the “proposed compromise distribution” under and 
“forming part of a reorganization plan” must be “fair and equitable” and the set-
tlement “fairly equivalent to the value of the potential claim surrendered.” 
Though the bankruptcy court must exercise its “informed, independent judgment” 
in reaching its determination, “the weighing of claim against compensation can-
not be an exact one.”); Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co. v. King Res. Co., 556 F.2d 471, 478–79 
(10th Cir. 1977) (affirming compromise based on district court’s “discretionary 
power to approve compromises involving claims and interests in reorganization 
proceedings,” which “judgment will not be reversed except for abuse of discre-
tion or if clearly erroneous,” and citing both TMT and Los Angeles Lumber); In 
re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 519 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1975) (chapter 
X). Further, the TMT rule was of sufficiently general applicability that courts 
applied it to many other areas, outside of bankruptcy law, in which court ap-
proval of a compromise is required. See, e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 38 
n.2 (2d Cir. 1978); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); In re 
Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 519 F.2d at 1277; Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 
1169, 1173 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Indus-
tries, Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1974). 
409 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a). 
410 See, e.g., Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kelley, 785 F.3d 273, 278–82 
(8th Cir. 2015) (chapter 11); In re MQVP Inc., 477 F. App’x 310, 313 (6th Cir. 2012) 
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bankruptcy.411 The present formulation of the TMT criteria re-
quires the bankruptcy court to consider: 
(a) [t]he probability of success in the litigation; 
(b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of 
collection; 
                                                                                                            
(chapter 7); In re Am. Cartage, Inc., 656 F.3d 82, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2011) (chapter 
7); In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 262–63 n.20 (5th Cir. 2010) (chapter 7); Saad v. 
GE HFS Holdings, Inc., 366 F. App’x 593, 604 n.11 (6th Cir. 2010) (chapter 11); 
In re Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell, L.L.P., 592 F.3d 664, 675 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (chapter 7); Tri-State Fin., LLC v. Lovald, 525 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (chapter 7); In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2d Cir. 
2007) (chapter 11, discussed supra Part VIII below); In re Doctors Hosp. of 
Hyde Park, Inc., 474 F.3d 421, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2007) (chapter 9); In re Arden, 
176 F.3d 1226, 1228–31 (9th Cir. 1999) (chapter 9); In re Bay Area Material 
Handling, Inc., 111 F.3d 137, 1997 WL 173922, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1997) 
(chapter 7); In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (chapter 7);  In re Foster 
Mortg. Corp., 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995) (chapter 11); In re Bond, 16 F.3d 
408, 1994 WL 20107, at *3 (4th Cir. 1994) (chapter 11); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 
886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (chapter 11 converted to chapter 7); Reiss v. 
Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890, 891–93 (10th Cir. 1989) (chapter 7); In re Texas Ex-
trusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1158–59 (5th Cir. 1988) (chapter 11, citing TMT 
and AWECO, affirmed settlement contained in plan because it was not an “abuse 
of discretion” without mention of whether the settlement complied with the 
absolute priority rule), aff’g 68 B.R. 712 (N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Emerald Oil Co., 
807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 1987) (chapter 11, affirming settlement, citing 
TMT and Matter of AWECO, also with no mention of whether the settlement 
complied with the absolute priority rule). See also In re Energy Future Hold-
ings Corp., 648 F. App’x 277, 280–81, 2016 WL 2343322, at *2 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(following Jevic and Iridium, discussed in section VIII below); In re ICL Hold-
ing Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 553–57 (3d Cir. 2015) (pursuant to settlement, the 
payment of some administrative claims—but not others of equal priority—and 
payment to unsecured creditors ahead of priority claim, by secured lenders who 
also had purchased the debtor’s assets in the bankruptcy case, was approved be-
cause the funds used were the secured lenders’ and not the estate’s property). 
411 Even the Supreme Court ultimately cited TMT, in a case involving an 
employment discrimination claim settlement in a non-bankruptcy context, for 
the principle that courts “judge the fairness of a proposed compromise by weighing 
the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and form 
of the relief offered in the settlement.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 
88 n.14 (1981). See, e.g., New England Health Care Emps’ Pension Fund v. 
Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1294–96 (10th Cir. 2008); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 
150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 
1176–77 (8th Cir. 1995); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 833 
(2d Cir. 1986); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 n.68 (11th Cir. 1985); 
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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(c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, 
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; [and] 
(d) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper defer-
ence to their reasonable views in the premises.412 
The vast majority of courts approving settlements under the 
Code have emphasized the paramount or best interest of credi-
tors—not absolute distributional priority.413 
The exception is the Fifth Circuit’s 1984 decision, In re 
AWECO.414 The court was persuaded that the “underlying poli-
cies” of bankruptcy law regarding absolute priority justified what 
the court acknowledged was an “extension of the fair and equitable 
standard” required for a cramdown plan to a settlement in chap-
ter 11.415 This Article argues that AWECO was wrongly decided. 
Congressional enactments since Los Angeles Lumber demonstrate 
only a limited policy regarding the absolute priority rule. The 
much stronger underlying policy is the best interest of creditors. 
C. Summary—Settlements Under the Bankruptcy Code Do Not 
Require Adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule 
Congress has not called for a settlement to comply with the 
absolute priority rule in order for the bankruptcy court to approve 
it.416 Section 27 of the Chandler Act, the pre-Code law, expressly 
gave the courts wide discretion, commanding only that the com-
promise or settlement serve the best interest of the estate.417 
Decided under the Act, the Supreme Court in TMT directed 
the courts to determine whether a proposed settlement was fair 
and equitable by undertaking a rigorous risk-benefit analysis before 
approving it.418 The Court did not refer at all to the absolute pri-
ority rule in the context of approval of the settlements at issue. 
                                                                                                            
412 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9019.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 15th ed. rev. 2010). 
413 See id. 
414 See generally In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
415 Id. at 298. 
416 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938). 
417 Id. 
418 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1968). 
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Congress enacted the Code in 1978 and again said nothing of 
the absolute priority rule in the context of settlements.419 Courts 
continued to apply the TMT standard under the Code.420 Nearly 
without exception, the opinions approving settlements in chap-
ters 11 and 7 have made no mention of absolute distributional 
priority and have focused on the paramount interest of creditors.421 
AWECO, decided in 1984, where the Fifth Circuit explicitly ac-
knowledged that it was extending the absolute priority rule to 
settlements for policy reasons, has remained an outlier.422 
No omnipresent congressional policy for absolute distributional 
priority exists under the Code, whether with respect to settle-
ments specifically or bankruptcy distributions generally.423 As ar-
gued above, any such policy under the current Code is far weaker and 
more narrowly contained than AWECO suggests. The stronger ar-
gument is that the policy at present, shaped by congressional 
bankruptcy enactments from 1952 to BAPCPA in 2005, favors ne-
gotiated resolutions evaluated by the courts determining the best 
interest of creditors without reference to the absolute priority rule. 
Critics of structured dismissals argue that courts’ authority is 
or should be different when the settling parties are seeking dis-
missal of the case immediately following the approval of the set-
tlement.424 The next section argues that these critics misconstrue 
the provisions of the Code that govern dismissals. 
V. DISMISSAL OF A CHAPTER 11 CASE AND OF CASES UNDER 
OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE CODE 
Critics of structured dismissals claim that such a resolution of 
a chapter 11 case exceeds the bounds of the Bankruptcy Code.425 
This section argues that this position is weak. Rather, Congress 
has given bankruptcy courts express authority to act in the best 
interest of creditors regarding the dismissal of chapter 11 cases. 
                                                                                                            
419 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1978). 
420 See supra notes 410–11 and accompanying text. 
421 See supra notes 410–11. 
422 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984).  
423 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
424 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 23, at 3 (citing In re Jevic Holding Co., Inc., 
Brief of Appellants, 2014 WL 3572018, at *45–46 (3d Cir. July 8, 2014)); Eitel 
et al., supra note 27, at 20. 
425 Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 1. 
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A. The Code Does Not Limit Chapter 11 Resolution to a Confirmed 
Plan, a Chapter 7 Liquidation, or a Plain Vanilla Dismissal Order 
The Code does not state that the only three paths to conclud-
ing a chapter 11 case are plan confirmation, conversion to chapter 
7, or a one page, plain vanilla order dismissing the case. The Code 
does not require that, on dismissal of a chapter 11 case, distribu-
tions must follow the descending priorities listed in section 507 or 
must be in accordance with the rule set forth in section 726 for 
chapter 7. Indeed, neither section 1112 (regarding the court’s dis-
missal of a chapter 11 case) nor section 349 (which sets forth the 
effects of such dismissal) refer at all to sections 507, 726, or 1129(b), 
or to any other rule of distributional priority.426 The Code instead 
expressly authorizes the court to act in the best interest of creditors 
in resolving a case other than by confirmation of a plan.427 
A debtor may obtain dismissal of its chapter 11 case under 
Code section 1112. Section 1112 authorizes the court to make its 
decision in furtherance of the “best interests of [the debtor’s] cred-
itors and the estate.”428 The court is not a passive player with re-
spect to the best course of action, and is not limited to granting or 
denying the motion.429 Section 1112 provides instead that the court 
may dismiss the chapter 11 case, may convert the case to chapter 7 
or may appoint a chapter 11 trustee to replace the debtor in posses-
sion, whichever “is in the best interest of creditors and the estate.”430 
                                                                                                            
426 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112. 
427 Id. § 1112(b)(1). 
428 Id. A debtor is a “party in interest” in chapter 11, and a party in interest 
may request dismissal of a chapter 11 case under section 1112(b). Id. § 1109(b).  
429 Id. § 1112(b)(1).  
430 Id. The 1977 House Report in its section-by-section analysis stated that 
section 1112(b) “gives wide discretion to the court to make an appropriate dis-
position of the case when a party in interest requests. The court is permitted 
to convert a reorganization case to a liquidation case or to dismiss the case, 
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595 at 405 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6361. The 1978 Senate 
Report contains similar commentary regarding the “wide discretion” given to 
the court by section 1112(b) “to make an appropriate disposition.” S. REP. 95-
989, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5903. Both reports 
refer to the ability of the court under section 1112(b) “to use its equitable powers 
to reach an appropriate result in individual cases.” Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 
at 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6362. 
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Section 349 states the ordinary effects of dismissals of a case 
in chapter 11, as well as chapters 9, 12, and 13.431 Section 349 
expressly gives a bankruptcy court the discretion to alter those 
effects and to decree terms in its dismissal orders that it deter-
mines appropriate “for cause.”432 
The text and structure of the Code underscore the discretion 
given by Congress to the courts to decree the best outcome in a 
bad situation when a case must be resolved outside of a plan. The 
Code’s text regarding plan filing is more permissive for chapter 
11 than for chapters 9, 12, and 13. Chapter 11 provides that a 
debtor “may file” a plan of reorganization or liquidation.433 Chap-
ters 9, 12, and 13 provide that a debtor “shall file” a plan,434 yet 
the debtor even in those chapters may move for and obtain an 
order dismissing the case435 on terms that the court “for cause” 
deems appropriate.436 Because chapters 9, 12, and 13 mandate the 
filing of a plan, one most likely would find in those chapters any 
congressional restrictions to courts entering something other than 
a plain vanilla dismissal order. Yet, no such limitations exist. 
No provision of the Code or the Bankruptcy Rules blocks the 
path to a structured dismissal by prohibiting court approval of a 
settlement followed by a dismissal. Rather, both section 1112(b) 
and the “for cause” discretion afforded by section 349(b) authorize 
a court to determine the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and 
estate in determining a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 case, 
whether in conjunction with a settlement or otherwise.437 The 
dominant congressional directive given to the bankruptcy court is 
                                                                                                            
431 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). 
432 Id. 
433 Id. § 1121 (emphasis added). 
434 See id. § 941 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 1221, 1321 (2012); ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 112 (2012) (“The traditional, commonly repeated rule is that shall is 
mandatory and may is permissive.”). Scalia and Garner assert that “notori-
ously sloppy” drafting has resulted in a “morass of confusing decisions” on the 
meaning of “shall,” but raise no semantical issue with the word “may.” Id. They 
further claim that “[w]hen drafters use shall and may correctly, the traditional 
rule holds—beautifully.” Id. 
435 11 U.S.C. §§ 930(a), 1112(b), 1208(b), 1307(b) (2012). 
436 Id. § 349(b). 
437 Id. §§ 349(b)(3), 1112(b)(1). 
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to pursue the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate, 
and that directive includes the court’s authority to alter ordinary 
outcomes in its discretion “for cause.”438 
B. The Dismissal of a Chapter 11 Case Revests Only the Property in 
the Estate at the Time of the Dismissal 
Second, critics of structured dismissals misstate the normal 
effects of dismissal and fail to recognize the continuing validity of 
a settlement post-dismissal. The normal effects of a dismissal are 
as follows. First, the dismissal “revests the property of the estate 
in the entity in which such property was vested immediately be-
fore the commencement of the case.”439 Second, receiverships and 
other custodianships that were superseded by the commencement 
of the bankruptcy case are reinstated.440 Third, some transfers 
and liens previously avoided over the course of the bankruptcy 
case are reinstated.441 
The first of these ordinary effects of a dismissal—the revesting—
is the most significant.442 An oft-cited statement in the legislative 
history of the 1978 Code suggests that Congress proposed by sec-
tion 349 to “undo” the bankruptcy and return parties to the status 
quo that existed on the petition date.443 
Yet the Code’s text does not expressly state whether the “prop-
erty of the estate” that revests is that which existed on the date 
on which the case commenced—by which construction the status 
quo on the commencement date would be restored—or that which 
exists in the estate on the date of the dismissal.444 The definition 
                                                                                                            
438 Id. §§ 349(b), 1112(b). 
439 Id. § 349(b)(3). 
440 Id. § 349(b)(1). Upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, a receiver or 
other court-appointed custodian in possession of property of the debtor case 
ordinarily loses authority to act on account of that property and must turn the 
property over to the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession. See id. 
§ 543(a)–(b). 
441 Id. § 349(b)(1)–(2). 
442 Id. § 349(b)(3). 
443 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 338 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6294; see 
also S. REP. 95-989, at 49 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835. 
444 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). 
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of “property of the estate” in chapter 11 arguably fills this statu-
tory gap in favor of the latter interpretation.445 Property of the 
estate in chapter 11 includes both the debtor’s property on the 
commencement date and after-acquired property.446 A debtor in 
possession completes numerous transactions prior to a dismissal. 
An interpretation of the “property of the estate” that revests under 
section 349(b)(3) is that existing on the dismissal date best har-
monizes section 541, which provides that after-acquired property 
is estate property, with section 349, because an interpretation of 
section 349 that turns back the clock for revesting to the petition 
date would “orphan” all property acquired postpetition.447 The more 
harmonious reading of section 349(b) is that estate property on the 
dismissal date revests in the party entitled to it on that date.448 
Moreover, courts with good reason—more pragmatic than tex-
tual—have construed section 349(b)(3) to mean that only the 
property of the estate determined as of the date of dismissal re-
vests.449 They have not required time travel back to the petition 
                                                                                                            
445 See id. § 541. 
446 See id. § 541(b). 
447 Id. §§ 349(b), 541(a). 
448 The canons of textual interpretation provide that the “text must be in-
terpreted as a whole,” which includes consideration of the entire language and 
design of the statute. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 434, at 167. “The impera-
tive of harmony among provisions is more categorical than most other canons 
of construction because it is invariably true that intelligent drafters do not con-
tradict themselves (in the absence of duress).” Id. at 180. 
449 See, e.g., United States v. Standard State Bank, 91 B.R. 874, 879 (W.D. 
Mo. 1988) (“Revesting ‘includes only that property left in the estate at the time 
of dismissal.’”); In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 270 (D.R.I. 1987) (“The few cases 
that mention subsection 349(b)(3) refer to its applicability only in the context 
of property or property rights that have not passed out of the bankruptcy es-
tate.”); In re Day, 292 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); In re Derrick, 190 
B.R. 346, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995) (“However, to equate dismissal with 
some form of time travel, unceremoniously dumping the parties where they 
were the moment before the debtor made the fateful choice to file bankruptcy, 
would be to say both too much and too little about the effect of § 349.”); In re 
Tri-Glied, Ltd., 179 B.R. 1014, 1020–21 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the 
lease held by debtor at commencement of case, which was rejected during case, 
does not revest in debtor on dismissal); In re Ethington, 150 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 1993) (“Were the Court to hold that dismissal of the case immediately 
revested the property in the debtor, beyond the reach of the Court to order 
payment of administrative fees, all parties who rendered postpetition services 
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date. Rather they have held that the revesting applies to property 
of the estate existing on the date of the dismissal, thus leaving 
postpetition transactions intact.450 Section 349(b)(3) thus “undoes” 
the bankruptcy only to a very limited extent. 
Were it otherwise, section 349(b)(3) would result in an unravel-
ing so extensive that the debtor’s creditors and other parties in in-
terest would suffer losses unfairly, and their justifiable reliance 
on the bankruptcy court’s orders would be defeated. In chapter 11, 
for example, a revesting dating back to the commencement of the 
case would reverse payments made to employees, taxing authori-
ties, bankruptcy counsel, trade creditors, and other administrative 
claimants over the course of the case. Liens and adequate protec-
tion given by the debtor in possession in connection with its ob-
taining postpetition financing or court approval of its use of cash 
collateral would be undone. Sales, purchases, compromises, and 
other transactions between the debtor in possession and third par-
ties made during the bankruptcy proceeding, both in the ordinary 
course451 and, outside the ordinary course of the debtor’s business 
with court approval, would be nullified.452 
A chapter 11 debtor in possession that operates its business in 
bankruptcy will have entered into hundreds or even thousands of 
such transactions between the commencement date of the bank-
ruptcy case and a dismissal. All of these transactions and actions 
will involve the debtor’s transferring or obtaining “property of the 
                                                                                                            
would be at the mercy of the debtor’s decision to terminate the case and leave 
those expenses unpaid.”); In re Kucera, 123 B.R. 852, 854–55 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1990) (determining that cash proceeds of after acquired property which was 
sold during the pendency of the bankruptcy case are subject to the secured 
creditor’s lien); In re Depew, 115 B.R. 965, 971–72 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (“It 
is noteworthy that § 349(b) does not mention or seek to reverse transfers out of 
the bankruptcy estate, such as those which might be made pursuant to § 363, 
§ 365(f), or § 726. This would seem to indicate that § 349(b) was designed to 
deal only with the property that was still part of the estate on the date of dis-
missal.”); In re BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945, 952 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(concluding that debtor’s lease rejected during the case does not revest in the 
debtor on dismissal of the case); see also In re Marine Maint. Co., 169 F.2d 548, 
551 (3d Cir. 1948) (finding that lease terminated by landlord pursuant to ipso 
facto clause upon filing of involuntary case that subsequently was dismissed 
cannot be reinstated notwithstanding the dismissal of the case). 
450 In re Searles, 70 B.R. at 270. 
451 11 U.S.C. § 363(c). 
452 Id. § 363(b). 
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estate.”453 A complex chapter 11 case that has gone on for months 
or years prior to its dismissal, in which the debtor’s business may 
have been sold and is now operating outside of bankruptcy as part 
of the new owner’s business, makes any effort to unscramble the 
egg a fool’s quest. The “property of the estate” that ordinarily re-
vests on dismissal can only mean property of the estate at the 
time of the dismissal, as the courts consistently have held.454 
C.  Congress Has Expressly Authorized the Bankruptcy Court “For 
Cause” to Order Otherwise 
Third, the critics of structured dismissals understate the 
broad scope given by Congress to alter the ordinary results of a 
dismissal “for cause” by ordering otherwise.455 The Bankruptcy 
Code in many of its provisions gives the bankruptcy court little or 
no flexibility.456 In other provisions though, including section 
349(b), Congress has given the bankruptcy courts the discretion 
to decide matters on a case-by-case basis, to develop rules of law 
that are not specifically delineated under the Code, and to reach 
beneficial results, including by authorizing the courts to approve 
certain actions and alter ordinary outcomes “for cause.”457 
The bankruptcy court’s “for cause” authority goes far beyond 
section 349. Congress permits a bankruptcy court “for cause” to 
                                                                                                            
453 Id. § 541(a)(1)–(2). 
454 In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266 at 270. 
455 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). 
456 See, e.g., id. § 941.  
457 Section 365 of the Code provides one of many examples of Code provi-
sions that give the court “for cause” flexibility in some clauses but not in other 
clauses of the same statutory section. See, e.g., id. § 365(b) (regarding the re-
quirements that must be satisfied for a debtor in possession or trustee to as-
sume a lease under which it has defaulted, which does not authorize the court 
to alter those requirements “for cause”); id. § 365(c) (regarding the require-
ments that must be satisfied for a debtor in possession or trustee to assume 
and/or assign a lease whether or not it is in default, which does not authorize 
the court to alter those requirements “for cause”). Compare id. § 365(d)(1) (pur-
suant to which the court “for cause” may extend delay for up to 60 days the 
requirement that the debtor “timely perform” its postpetition obligations under 
a lease), with id. § 365(d) (which permits a debtor in possession or trustee to 
extend “for cause” the 120-day period within which it must assume or reject a 
lease, but does not permit an extension beyond 210 days even if there is cause, 
unless each landlord has given its written consent). 
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limit the public’s access to papers to protect an individual or her 
property from injury.458 The court “for cause” may require that 
petitioners in an involuntary case file a bond,459 may grant relief 
from the automatic stay,460 and may limit a secured creditor’s 
credit bid of its allowed secured claim at a sale.461 It may extend 
“for cause” both the time for a trustee or debtor in possession to 
assume or reject leases and executory contracts462 and the exclu-
sive period within which a debtor in possession may file a plan 
and seek acceptances of it.463 The court may oust a debtor in pos-
session from authority to act for the estate by appointing “for 
cause” a chapter 11 trustee with such authority.464 In all, there 
appear to be more than forty instances in which Congress gave 
the bankruptcy court the power to act “for cause.”465 
Congress did not define “for cause” in the Code. In some in-
stances, Congress has given guidance by providing non-exclusive 
examples of what constitutes “cause.”466 Other sections of the 
Code that permit entry of an order “for cause” say nothing about 
what might constitute cause.467 
Section 349(b) provides no illustrative examples regarding 
what constitutes “cause” under that section. Courts have construed 
the “for cause” provision of section 349(b) to give them the express 
statutory authority, informed by and in furtherance of other Code 
provisions and the policies of the Code, to act flexibly in dismissing 
                                                                                                            
458 Id. § 107(c). 
459 Id. § 303(e). 
460 Id. § 362(d)(1). 
461 Id. § 363(k). 
462 Id. § 365(d)(4). 
463 Id. § 1121(d)(1). 
464 Id. § 1104(a)(1). 
465 Id. §§ 107(c), 109(h)(3)(B), 303(e), 324(a), 341(e), 345(b)(2), 348(b), 349(a)–(b), 
362(d)(1), 362(d)(3), 363(k), 365(d)(1), 365(d)(3), 365(d)(4)(b)(i), 502(j), 503(a), 
505(b)(2)(A)(ii), 521(a)(2)(A)–(B), 524(m)(1), 557(c)(1), 707(a), 930(a), 1102(a)(3), 
1104(a)(1), 1112(b)(1), 1121(d)(1), 1121(e)(1)(B), 1141(d)(5)(A), 1202(b)(2), 1204(a), 
1208(c), 1222(c), 1224, 1229(c), 1307(c), 1322(d)(2), 1329(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(d), 
1441(d) (2012). The Rules also expressly authorize the court’s granting relief and 
authorizing actions “for cause” in numerous instances. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 1017(e)(1), 1019(1)(B), 2002(p)(2)–(3), 2006(f), 2015(a)(6), 2015(d), 3002(c)(1), 
3017(d)(4), 3018(a), 4003(b)(1), 4004(b)(1), 4007(c)–(d), 9033(c), 9037(d) (2012). 
466 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.  § 1104(a)(1). 
467 See, e.g., id. § 363(k). 
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a bankruptcy case.468 Some courts have used the “for cause” au-
thority of section 349(b) to protect rights acquired in reliance on 
the bankruptcy case.469 Those and other courts have exercised 
their “for cause” authority under section 349(b) to further the 
Code’s purpose of equitable treatment to creditors.470 
The Seventh Circuit has defined “cause” under section 349(b) 
to mean “an acceptable reason,”471 with the proviso that a 
“[d]esire to make an end run around a statute is not an adequate 
reason.”472 The same circuit in a subsequent case held that, in the 
absence of an effort to make an “end run,” the court’s varying the 
ordinary outcome of a dismissal “for cause” was within its discre-
tion under section 349(b).473 
Courts in numerous cases in chapters 12 and 13 have changed 
the ordinary outcomes of section 349(b) “for cause.” On various 
grounds, those courts have altered the revesting that would ordi-
narily occur on a dismissal “for cause.”474 
                                                                                                            
468 In re Lewis, 346 B.R. 89, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); see also In re Clements, 
495 B.R. 74, 87, n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[O]n its face, the Code accords the 
bankruptcy court more discretion to vary the statutory default treatment of 
undistributed plan payments when a chapter 13 case is dismissed than upon 
conversion to chapter 7.”). 
469 Wiese v. Cmty. Bank of Cent. Wis., 552 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977)); see also In re Keener, 268 B.R. 912, 919 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2001); In re TNT Farms, 226 B.R. 436, 442 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998). 
470 Wiese, 552 F.3d at 590 (citing In re Derrick, 190 B.R. 346, 351 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1995)); TNT Farms, 226 B.R. at 442.  
471 In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991). 
472 Judge Easterbrook described his reasons for cutting off the “end run” in 
Sadler as follows:  
Congress specified that Chapter 13 cases pending on the effec-
tive date of Chapter 12 may not be converted. It would defeat 
this express decision to treat as “cause” the debtors’ wish to file 
a new Chapter 12 case with all dates relating back to the orig-
inal Chapter 13 proceeding. That would be, as we remarked in 
Sinclair, conversion by another name. It is not part of the judi-
cial office to seek out creative ways to defeat statutes. 
Id. 
473 Wiese, 552 F.3d at 591–92. 
474 For chapter 12, see Wiese, 552 F.3d at 590, 592, where the terms of con-
firmed chapter 12 plan, including debtor’s release of lender liability claims, re-
mained binding on the parties. In re Fox, 140 B.R. 761, 764–65 (Bankr. D.S.D. 
1992), holding estate funds would not revest in the debtor but would remain 
available to pay counsel fees allowed post-dismissal. For chapter 13, see In re 
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In chapter 11, courts have modified ordinary revesting “for 
cause” by ordering that funds not be returned to the debtor on 
dismissal because it would not be fair to a creditor of the debtor.475 
A court has delayed for 180 days the revesting of property, to pre-
vent an “imaginative” serial-filing debtor from obtaining the ben-
efit of a subsequent stay by filing another bankruptcy case after 
the dismissal.476 Courts “for cause” have denied a chapter 11 debtor’s 
request for possession of premises under a prepetition lease that 
                                                                                                            
Kee, 2015 WL 5860492, at *1 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015), regarding some chap-
ter 13 trustees’ practice of distributing debtor’s plan payments on hand on dis-
missal to creditors pursuant to confirmed plan pursuant to section 349(b); see 
also In re Cusano, 431 B.R. 726, 730–31, 738 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (ordering 
that royalties payable to debtor be paid instead to the clerk of the court for 
distribution in pursuant to pending non-bankruptcy litigation); In re Kirk, 537 
B.R. 856, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2015) (exercising discretion in furtherance of 
section 1326(a)(2) directing chapter 13 trustee to deduct administrative ex-
penses from funds held prior to returning funds to debtor); In re Hufford, 460 
B.R. 172, 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011) (finding that debtor’s motion to recover 
funds from the chapter 13 trustee, on ground that dismissal had effectively 
vacated confirmed plan resulting in the revesting of the funds with the debtor, 
denied); In re Shields, 431 B.R. 446, 450 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010) (paying funds 
on hand to administrative expense claimants; only remaining balance revests 
in the debtor); In re Cox, 381 B.R. 525, 529 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (ordering 
debtor’s funds held by chapter 13 trustee on dismissal to be distributed in ac-
cordance with the confirmed plan); In re Lewis, 346 B.R. at 111, 115 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2006) (exercising discretion in furtherance of section 1326(a)(2) direct-
ing chapter 13 trustee to deduct administrative expenses from funds held prior 
to returning funds to debtor); In re Witte, 279 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2002) (ordering chapter 13 trustee to hold cash proceeds of sale of the debtors’ 
house court order determining whether lien holders were entitled to the pro-
ceeds); In re Prud’homme, 161 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (ordering 
that property would not revest in a chapter 13 debtor for eighteen months to 
protect against the debtor’s repeated bankruptcy filings); In re DeLuca, 142 
B.R. 687, 688, 691 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (ordering chapter 13 trustee to hold funds 
on hand at dismissal pending the court’s consideration of fee applications filed 
by the debtor’s counsel, voiding a post-dismissal tax levy against those funds in 
order to enable the payment of those counsel fees); In re Torres, 2000 WL 1515170, 
at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (ordering debtor’s funds held by chapter 13 
trustee on dismissal to be distributed in accordance with the confirmed plan). 
475 In re Gonic Realty Tr., 909 F.2d 624, 627 (1st Cir. 1990). 
476 In re Halpern, 229 B.R. 67, 76–77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (delaying 180 
days for the purpose of restraining debtor from “betting with the other guy’s 
money,” in the hope of delaying liquidation until “the market will turn and he 
will be able to salvage something out of a sale after payment of his obligation 
to his partners”). 
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had been rejected in its prior chapter 11 case that was dis-
missed.477 Courts “for cause” under section 349(b) have ordered 
payments to some creditors other than in the order listed in sec-
tion 507 and have approved a structured dismissal as the “least 
bad alternative” when compared with a “nihilistic” exercise that 
would result in nothing for unsecured creditors.478 
D.  Summary—Congress Has Directed Bankruptcy Courts 
to Pursue the Best Interest of Creditors and Not Absolute 
Distributional Priority in Determining to Dismiss a  
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case 
In sum, if a chapter 11 plan is not confirmable or for other 
“cause,” the Code authorizes the bankruptcy court to convert the 
chapter 11 case to chapter 7, to cause the appointment of a chap-
ter 11 trustee, or to dismiss the case.479 Congress expressly has au-
thorized the courts to determine which of these alternatives is in 
the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate.480 Further, 
the strongest textual interpretation of section 349 is that the prop-
erty that revests is that existing on the date of the dismissal.481 
The courts are not required to turn back the clock to the petition 
date and undo all of the transactions that occurred prior to dis-
missal.482 The courts have so held, mostly on pragmatic rather than 
textual grounds.483 On this construction, a settlement approved 
                                                                                                            
477 In re BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945, 952 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (con-
cluding that lease rejection in prior, dismissed chapter 11 case occurred by op-
eration of law pursuant to section 365(d)(4), because the debtor had not timely 
assumed the lease; construing section 349 to revest the lease in the debtor “would 
utterly defeat the intent of section 365(d)(4),” which the court harmonized with 
§ 365(d)(4) by using the “flexibility inherent” in section 349 “to prevent a les-
see’s bankruptcy from holding a nondebtor lessor hostage to repeated filings.”). 
478 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015). See also 
the list of unpublished cases in Hon. Kevin J. Carey et al., Delaware Views from 
the Bench: Structured Dismissals, AM. BANKR. INST., at 52–53 (2013), http:// 
www.abi.org/education-events/sessions/structured-dismissals [https://perma.cc 
/6GXM-736Y]. 
479 See supra notes 476–78 and accompanying text. 
480 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
481 See supra notes 445–49 and accompanying text. 
482 See supra notes 477–50 and accompanying text. 
483 See supra notes 477–50 and accompanying text. 
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by the court survives the dismissal of the case. Moreover, Congress 
has given courts broad discretion to alter normal revesting “for 
cause.”484 In sharp contrast to these statutory provisions, the 
Code says nothing of the absolute priority rule on a dismissal. 
VI. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: JEVIC, IRIDIUM, AND AWECO 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Jevic485 on the 
question of whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distri-
bution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the stat-
utory priority scheme.486 Three circuit courts have considered the 
issue: the Third Circuit in In re Jevic Holding Corp. in 2015;487 
the Second Circuit in In re Iridium Operating LLC in 2007;488 and 
the Fifth Circuit in In re Matter of AWECO, Inc. in 1984.489 Both 
Jevic and Iridium allowed for bankruptcy court approval of a pre-
plan settlement in chapter 11 if it was in the best interest of cred-
itors, even if it was not in accord with the absolute priority rule.490 In 
contrast, AWECO applied a per se rule by which any distributions 
pursuant to a settlement in chapter 11 must be in the order of 
absolute priority.491 A summary of each of Jevic, Iridium, and 
AWECO follows. 
A.  In re Jevic Holding Corp. 
Little was left of the Jevic debtors or their property more than 
four years after the debtor commenced its chapter 11 case.492 The 
                                                                                                            
484 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
485 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), petition 
for cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649). 
486 Id. 
487 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015). 
488 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2007) (finding that set-
tlements that result in distributions to unsecured creditors other than in accor-
dance with the priorities of the Code section 507 may be approved in a narrow 
band of circumstances in which there are specific and credible grounds to jus-
tify the deviation). 
489 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that settle-
ments outside of a plan must comply with the “absolute priority rule”). 
490 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 183–84; In re Iridium Operating 
LLC, 478 F.3d at 466. 
491 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298. 
492 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 2014 WL 268613, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014). 
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debtors had sold their property and used the proceeds to pay a 
group of secured lenders headed by CIT Group (“CIT”).493 Another 
secured lender, Sun Capital Partners, had a lien against the debt-
ors’ $1.7 million in cash, and a claim that exceeded that amount.494 A 
subsidiary of Sun also owned the equity in the debtors, having 
acquired the debtors two years before the bankruptcy filing in a 
leveraged buyout financed by CIT.495 
The debtors’ only remaining asset was a suit that the official 
committee of unsecured creditors had brought against CIT and 
Sun on a derivative basis.496 The committee claimed that Sun had 
used virtually none of its own money to acquire the debtors.497 
Instead, with CIT’s assistance, it had leveraged the debtors’ as-
sets to make the acquisition, saddling the debtors with debt they 
could not service and hastening their demise.498 Accordingly, the 
committee alleged that the transaction was an avoidable fraudu-
lent transfer.499 Though the committee’s suit had survived a motion 
to dismiss, the bankruptcy court found that the action was “far 
from compelling, especially in view of CIT’s and Sun’s substantial 
resources” and the committee’s having none.500 
The structured dismissal in Jevic involved a $3.7 million set-
tlement of the committee’s action.501 CIT would pay $2 million into 
an account earmarked for professional fees and other priority ad-
ministrative expenses, and Sun would assign its lien in the debtors’ 
$1.7 million of cash to a trust that would pay in full the remaining 
priority administrative expense claims and priority taxes, and the 
balance of the $3.7 million pro rata to general unsecured credi-
tors.502 The settling parties requested the court to approve the 
settlement and immediately thereafter dismiss the case.503 
                                                                                                            
493 Id. at *1. 
494 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177. 
495 Id. at 176–77. 
496 Code section 1102 provides that the United States Trustee shall appoint 
an official committee of unsecured creditors in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. 
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012). 
497 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176. 
498 Id. 
499 Id. 
500 Id. at 180. 
501 Id. at 188. 
502 Id. at 176–77. 
503 Id. at 180; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1112(e) (2012). 
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Other unsecured creditors in Jevic, who were not parties to the 
settlement and who would receive nothing under it, and the 
United States Trustee, opposed the motion.504 The objecting cred-
itors were a class of truck drivers formerly employed by the debtors 
who were pursuing Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion (WARN) Act claims against both the debtors and Sun.505 
Their collective claim was in the amount of $12.4 million by their 
own estimation, $8.3 million of which they asserted as an unsecured 
priority wage claim under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(4).506 
Though the drivers were not barred from participating in the set-
tlement negotiations, they ultimately were not parties to the set-
tlement because they did not reach an agreement providing for 
the dismissal of the WARN claims against Sun.507 So long as the 
WARN litigation continued, Sun, which was contributing $1.7 
million toward the settlement, was unwilling to pay the drivers 
without being given a release because it “did not want to fund 
litigation against itself.”508 
The drivers and the United States Trustee argued that the 
proposed settlement and dismissal violated the absolute priority 
rule.509 They further asserted that the Code “does not permit 
structured dismissals.”510 
The bankruptcy court found that there was “no realistic pros-
pect” of confirming a plan or of a “meaningful distribution” to any 
unsecured creditor unless it approved the settlement.511 A conver-
sion to chapter 7 would be “unavailing” because the chapter 7 
trustee would have no funds with which to litigate the commit-
tee’s claims and “the secured creditors had ‘stated unequivocally 
and credibly that they would not do this deal in a Chapter 7.’”512 
The court held that while chapter 11 plans must comply with 
the Code’s distributional priority scheme, settlements do not.513 The 
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settlement did not prejudice the drivers because the debtor had 
no unencumbered assets or funds with which to pay the drivers.514 
The drivers’ claims were “effectively worthless.”515 
Finally, the court determined that the settlement was fair and 
equitable under Bankruptcy Rule 9019,516 given the low possibil-
ity that the committee would win on the merits, the complexity of 
the case, and the high costs of proceeding.517 Faced with the “dire” 
outcome of either “a meaningful return or zero,” the “‘paramount 
interest of the creditors mandate[d] approval of the settlement’ 
and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code dictated otherwise.”518 
The district court affirmed, including because the settlement 
“was in the best interest of the estate and of resolving the pending 
Chapter 11 cases.”519 The drivers and the United States Trustee 
appealed.520 
The Third Circuit emphasized that none of the objectors con-
tended that the bankruptcy court had erred in determining that 
the settlement was fair and equitable under the TMT standard.521 
Further, cause existed under section 1112(b)(1) to convert the 
case to chapter 7 or dismiss the case, “whichever [was] in the best 
interests of creditors and the estate.”522 
The objectors argued that there were only three avenues available 
to the debtors: convert to chapter 7, confirm a plan, or dismiss 
“with no strings attached.”523 The Third Circuit characterized a 
structured dismissal as simply a dismissal “preceded by other orders 
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of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving settlements, grant-
ing releases, and so forth) that remain in effect after dismissal.”524 
Further, revesting under section 349(b) did not require a “hard 
reset” but authorized the court “for cause” to order otherwise.525 
The drivers urged that a bankruptcy court’s broad power to 
approve settlements and structured dismissals that do not strictly 
comply with the priorities listed in section 507 could “render … 
superfluous” the plan confirmation process set forth in chapter 
11.526 The court reasoned that, even if that were true, the Code 
forbade only a structured dismissal contrived to circumvent or 
evade the protections of the plan confirmation or conversion pro-
cess.527 Since there was no prospect of a confirmable plan, and 
conversion to chapter 7 “was a bridge to nowhere,” that issue was 
not before it.528 
Rather, the court reasoned, settlements are favored in bank-
ruptcy, and the Code and the Rules left bankruptcy courts “more 
flexibility in approving settlements than in confirming plans of reor-
ganization.”529 Compliance with the Code’s priorities “will usually 
be dispositive of whether a proposed settlement is fair and equi-
table.”530 “Settlements that skip objecting creditors in distributing 
estate assets raise justifiable concerns about collusion.”531 The 
court held nonetheless that a bankruptcy court may approve a settle-
ment in chapter 11 that deviates from the absolute priority rule if 
there are “specific and credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.”532 
The Third Circuit in Jevic acknowledged that the case before it 
was “a close call,” but concluded that the bankruptcy court “had suf-
ficient reason to approve the settlement and structured dismissal.”533 
“This disposition, unsatisfying as it was, remained the least bad 
alternative since there was ‘no prospect’ of a plan being confirmed 
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and conversion to Chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured 
creditors taking all that remained of the estate in ‘short order.’”534 
B.  In re Iridium Operating LLC 
The situation in In re Iridium Operating LLC was equally 
bleak. The debtor’s secured lenders “asserted liens over much of 
what [was] left of Iridium.”535 The official committee of unsecured 
creditors contested the liens.536 The committee also sought to pur-
sue claims against the debtor’s former sole shareholder, Motorola, 
Inc., but lacked the funds to do so.537 The committee “decided to 
seek a settlement with the [secured] [l]enders and to focus its lit-
igation efforts on Motorola.”538 
The committee and the lenders reached a settlement one and 
a half years into the bankruptcy case.539 The settlement acknowl-
edged the lenders’ security interest in the estate’s remaining 
cash, but provided for the distribution of only part of that cash to 
the lenders.540 The $37.5 million balance of the cash would fund 
a litigation trust and be used by the committee to sue Motorola.541 
The secured lenders and the estate would split any recoveries 
from the Motorola suit.542 
Litigation recoveries would go to the estate and pay the prior-
ity administrative claims first, and then general unsecured 
claims under a liquidating plan “according to the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority scheme.”543 The trust would pay any unused por-
tion of the $37.5 million that remained at the end of the litigation 
directly to general unsecured creditors.544 
Motorola, which asserted a priority administrative expense 
claim against the debtor in addition to its equity ownership interest 
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in the debtor, objected to the settlement.545 It argued that under 
one outcome, estate property would be distributed to lower prior-
ity creditors (the general unsecured creditors) before any payments 
to Motorola on account of its priority claim.546 
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and the district 
court affirmed.547 Motorola appealed.548 The Second Circuit held 
that a settlement outside of a plan does not necessarily implicate 
the absolute priority rule,549 and declined to apply the per se rule 
formulated by the Fifth Circuit in AWECO.550 Nonetheless, the most 
important factor for approval of a pre-plan settlement was whether 
distributions under it complied with the Code’s priority scheme.551 
The Second Circuit held that, if the committee in pursuit of its 
duty to maximize creditor recoveries reached a settlement “that 
in some way impair[ed] the rule of priorities, it must come before 
the bankruptcy court with specific and credible grounds to justify 
that deviation and the court must carefully articulate its reasons 
for approval of the agreement.”552 Since the committee had not 
done so, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for it to as-
sess the justification.553 
C.  In re AWECO, Inc. 
The debtor in In re AWECO, Inc. filed its chapter 11 case after 
commencement of a $27 million breach of contract claim against 
it.554 Several months later, the debtor filed its plan of reorganiza-
tion but never solicited acceptances from its creditors.555 The 
debtor subsequently settled the contract claim for $5.3 million 
and sought bankruptcy court approval of the settlement.556 
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Several creditors objected, including a judgment creditor 
whose lien extended to certain of the debtor’s assets, the IRS that 
asserted priority tax claims, and the Department of Energy that 
held an unsecured claim.557 The bankruptcy court found that the 
settlement was “fair and equitable” and in the best interest of the 
debtor, its estate, and creditors, and approved it.558 The IRS and 
the Department of Energy appealed.559 The district court concluded 
that the settlement benefitted all creditors because it would give 
the debtor its only chance at reorganization, and affirmed.560 The 
IRS appealed.561 
The Fifth Circuit found convincing the policy arguments in 
support of some extension of the “fair and equitable standard” to 
settlements outside of a plan and reversed.562 The court reasoned 
that the goal of absolute distributional priority arises when the 
bankruptcy case commences.563 Based on the “bankruptcy law’s 
underlying policies,” it made “a limited extension of the fair and 
equitable standard: a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in 
approving a settlement with a junior creditor unless the court 
concludes that priority of payment will be respected as to object-
ing senior creditors.”564 
VII.  THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 
A debtor and its stakeholders confront a bleak reality when 
seeking the best resolution in a chapter 11 case in which a plan is 
not confirmable. The bankruptcy court in Jevic had the unenviable 
task of determining whether to approve a negotiated resolution and 
structured dismissal that salvaged some value for creditors, but 
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did not adhere to the absolute priority rule. The Supreme Court 
in Jevic is expected to decide whether bankruptcy courts have the 
authority to approve such a settlement. 
The case for structured dismissals begins with the Code’s text. 
The absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation or the fail-
ure to file or obtain confirmation of a plan by the time required by 
the Code or the court constitutes cause for the court to dismiss or 
convert the case.565 Once the bankruptcy court finds cause to dis-
miss, Congress gives the court broad discretion to dismiss the case 
or convert it to chapter 7, “whichever is in the best interests of 
creditors and the estate.”566 The Code provisions that address the 
effects of a dismissal do not require an “undo” of settlements or 
any of the numerous other transactions that occurred during the 
proceeding prior to the dismissal. Even if they did, Congress has 
given the bankruptcy court broad discretion to order otherwise for 
cause.567 The bankruptcy court’s authority to approve a settle-
ment similarly is broad and based on long-standing precedent 
that Congress has not constrained in the Code.568 
Textual support is lacking for the requirement that all negotiated 
resolutions and dismissals comply with the absolute priority rule. 
Moreover, the role of the absolute priority rule is highly circum-
scribed by the text of the current Code, contrary to the assertions of 
the critics of structured dismissals.569 Congressional enactments in 
the years since Los Angeles Lumber make clear that the limited 
reach of the absolute priority rule in chapter 11 and under the pres-
ent Code is no accident.570 
A structured dismissal, such as that approved by the court in 
Jevic, is the result of negotiations that typically conclude with a 
settlement that gives something to some unsecured creditors.571 
The alternative in Jevic, as in many such cases, was a conversion 
to chapter 7 in which unsecured creditors would receive nothing.572 
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The structured dismissal in Jevic was in the best interest of the 
unsecured creditors and thus the court was correct in approving it. 
Critics expressly or by inference raise a number of concerns 
with a rule that permits settlements that do not adhere to the 
absolute priority rule. They assert that a structured dismissal, 
such as was approved in Jevic, is nothing more than an end run 
around the absolute priority rule.573 They claim that such settle-
ments often result from and encourage collusive behavior that de-
prives middle priority claimants of their due.574 They argue that 
higher priority claims, such as the workers’ claims in Jevic, remain 
unpaid though more junior claims are paid.575 This Article ad-
dresses these arguments in turn. 
A structured dismissal is not an end run around the process 
for obtaining plan confirmation or the distributional priorities 
that apply to a rejecting class under a chapter 11 cramdown plan 
if, as in Jevic, a plan is not confirmable. Rather, in a case in which 
a chapter 11 plan is not confirmable, Congress has authorized the 
bankruptcy court to decide whether and how to dismiss or convert 
the case based on the court’s determination of what is in the best 
interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate.576 The Code’s provi-
sions governing dismissal do not require adherence to distribu-
tional priorities. 
Even so, the end run critique might find some traction if the 
absolute priority rule pervaded the Code or chapter 11, but it does 
not. The absolute priority rule reached its zenith by a judicial 
launch in Los Angeles Lumber. Since then, Congress has brought 
the rule much closer to earth, so that today it has a far smaller 
and very specific, if important, role in chapter 11 and the Code. 
The very reorganization plan, a consensual plan, that the Supreme 
Court held was not confirmable in Los Angeles Lumber would be 
confirmable since 1979 under the Code.577 Other protections shield 
creditors in chapter 11.578 Under the Code, acting in the best in-
terest of creditors is a stronger, expressly stated policy. 
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A settlement negotiated by the parties at arm’s length that 
benefits creditors and the estate is distinguishable from a settle-
ment that results from collusion and does not. The bankruptcy 
courts must regularly make such a distinction with respect to set-
tlements, sales, and other transactions brought to the court for 
approval, both outside of and in connection with, a plan.579 The 
court made such a determination in Jevic. The WARN claimants 
in Jevic participated in the negotiations that resulted in a settle-
ment.580 The reason that the settlement provided nothing for the 
WARN claimants was not collusion. Rather, they would not agree 
to release their claims in consideration of the settlement amount, 
which is the fundamental exchange in any monetary settlement.581 
Not surprisingly, the party funding the settlement was not willing 
to pay settlement funds to the non-releasing WARN claimants, be-
cause the latter would just use those funds to pursue their litigation 
against the former.  
Determining whether a proposed settlement resulted from col-
lusion among the settling parties is a fact-intensive undertaking. 
Requiring adherence to the absolute priority rule will not flush 
out or prevent such collusion. The debt and capital structures of 
distressed companies have evolved since the days of equity receiv-
erships and since the enactment of the Code. In Jevic, the settling 
party asserted both a senior secured claim and a junior ownership 
interest.582 In Iridium, the objecting party, Motorola, asserted 
both a high priority administrative expense claim and a junior 
ownership interest.583 Even the WARN claimants in Jevic as-
serted both a priority unsecured claim and a lower priority general 
unsecured claim.584 Which hat was each of these parties wearing 
at the time of the settlement negotiations? 
Moreover, in none of Jevic, Iridium, or AWECO, did the debt-
ors’ managers or shareholders, in concert with the secured creditors, 
walk off with the residual value of the company at the expense of 
unsecured creditors.585 Facts such as these have nothing in common 
                                                                                                            
579 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184. 
580 Id. at 176–77. 
581 Id. at 177–78. 
582 See id. at 175–76. 
583 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 456, 459, 465 (2d Cir. 2007). 
584 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177. 
585 See id. at 176; see also In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 459; In 
re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 296–97 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 
2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 529 
with the practices that gave rise to the rule that shareholders could 
not retain the residual value of a business enterprise by colluding 
with the senior creditors to give other creditors nothing, as was the 
case in the equity receiverships which preceded the Chandler Act 
and the Code. The bankruptcy court in Jevic correctly found that 
the settlement was reached not by collusion, but as the result of ne-
gotiations in which the WARN claimants had a seat at the table.586 
That and other facts regarding the course of the negotiations are 
better indicators of whether the settlement and structured dis-
missal resulted from collusion or from arm’s length negotiations 
based on the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions as 
well as their willingness to compromise. 
Further, it is not appropriate to evaluate a structured dismissal 
based on whether the unpaid stakeholder is more, or less appealing 
than the stakeholder who is paid from the settlement that resulted 
from the negotiations. Congress, by directing that a dismissal accord 
with the best interest of creditors and by authorizing a bankruptcy 
court “for cause” to decree appropriate terms in the dismissal order, 
expressly allowed for some “play in the joints” of the Code.587 That 
flexibility gives bankruptcy judges the authority and discretion to 
approve a settlement and structured dismissal that provides the 
greatest good to the greatest number.588 In Jevic those who bene-
fitted included general unsecured creditors who, but for the set-
tlement, would have received nothing, and excluded the holders 
of senior WARN claims who would not agree to give a release in 
exchange for the terms of the settlement.589 In the next case, those 
who benefit might include employees, who but for the settlement 
would receive nothing, and might exclude certain senior adminis-
trative expense claimants such as, estate professionals who do not 
agree to give a release in exchange for the settlement terms. In 
the case after that, both parties might agree to give releases and 
thus share in a settlement fund that would not be available ab-
sent such releases.  The Code’s text expressly enables this process 
when a plan is not confirmable, and in such a case authorizes the 
court to approve the negotiated resolution if it is in the best inter-
est of creditors.590 
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The elephant in the room, of course, is whether there are any 
limiting factors on a bankruptcy court’s dismissing a case and de-
creeing terms of the dismissal that do not comply with the abso-
lute priority rule. Both Congress and the courts in Jevic and Iridium 
addressed this reasonable concern by requiring that a structured 
dismissal must be in the best interest of creditors.591 
Congress, in the Code, directs bankruptcy courts to resolve a 
chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable based on a de-
termination of what is in the best interest of creditors.592 It has 
given the courts the discretionary authority to enter a dismissal 
order that contains terms that alter the ordinary effect of a dis-
missal for cause.593 This express congressional grant of authority 
and discretion to the bankruptcy courts is not unique to the reso-
lution of a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable, and 
applies to many other decisions made by the bankruptcy courts.594 
Congress could easily have limited the bankruptcy courts’ authority 
and discretion with respect to a dismissal, and could have made 
the absolute priority rule applicable to a dismissal. It did not do 
so. The congressional direction is clear. 
Moreover, the courts in their exercise of this authority have 
not abused it. Both Iridium and Jevic were decided on narrow 
grounds.595 Each court considered both the best interest of credi-
tors as a whole and the specific interest of creditors who were not 
part of the settlement.596 The Second Circuit in Iridium required 
that settling parties “come before the bankruptcy court with specific 
and credible grounds to justify [a] deviation” from the priorities 
applicable in chapter 7 so it could carefully formulate and articu-
late its reasons for approving the settlement.597 Since the creditors’ 
committee had not established those grounds, the court remanded 
                                                                                                            
591 Id. § 1112(b)(1); see also In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 182, 186; 
In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 456, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007). 
592 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). 
593 Id. § 349. 
594 See supra notes 437–38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 450 
and accompanying text. 
595 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85; In re Iridium Operat-
ing LLC, 487 F.3d at 461–62, 464–66. 
596 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177, 180, 186; In re Iridium 
Operating LLC, 487 F.3d at 461, 465. 
597 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 487 F.3d at 466. 
 
2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 531 
to the bankruptcy court for it to assess the justification for ap-
proval.598 The bankruptcy court in Jevic found that a plan was not 
confirmable. It found that the WARN claimants had a seat at the 
negotiating table.599 They were not part of the ultimate settle-
ment because they would not release their claims in exchange for 
the payment being made by the secured creditors, and the secured 
creditors were not willing to make the settlement payments un-
less they received the release from the WARN claimants.600 Fur-
ther, a conversion to chapter 7 would result in no distribution to any 
unsecured creditors, whether priority or otherwise.601 Neither the 
Third Circuit in Jevic nor the Second Circuit in Iridium casually 
disregarded the distributional priorities applicable in chapter 7 
or to a chapter 11 cramdown plan, or the interests of those claim-
ants who were not part of the settlement. Each court required 
specific and credible grounds for a deviation from the priorities 
applicable in chapter 7 and under a cramdown plan. The Jevic 
court held, rightfully, that such deviation was justified because a 
plan was not confirmable and the settlement and structured dis-
missal provided the greatest distribution to the greatest number 
of unsecured creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has not enthroned absolute priority or a policy that 
favors it atop the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, it has lowered the 
doctrine’s place, severely and consistently, since 1952. 
The rule was never as absolute in application in the equity re-
ceiverships as it was in courts’ pronouncements in the dozen years 
following the Chandler Act. The Supreme Court in Los Angeles 
Lumber nonetheless exalted the rule and the policy behind it 
shortly after the Chandler Act became law, by making absolute 
priority synonymous with the term “fair and equitable.”602 For a 
very few years thereafter the federal courts, following Los Angeles 
Lumber, extended the rule to plans under chapters X, XI, and XII 
of the Chandler Act.603 
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Congress, beginning a dozen years after Los Angeles Lumber 
and repeatedly and unwaveringly in the six decades since, has 
contracted the reach of the absolute priority rule. The assertion 
by the AWECO court and certain commentators of a congressional 
policy favoring a pervasive rule requiring absolute distributional 
priority in bankruptcy generally, and in chapter 11 specifically, is 
simply inaccurate. 
The justification for extending the reach of the absolute prior-
ity rule to a structured dismissal is especially weak if a plan is 
not confirmable and equity will receive nothing or will receive 
only a release in exchange for its contribution of cash used to 
make a distribution to other creditors. The primary purpose of the 
absolute priority rule was always to keep managers and share-
holders from misappropriating the enterprise’s residual value in 
a reorganization, unless unsecured creditors received a reasonable 
value for their claims.604 
Has Congress in all bankruptcy cases required payment to pri-
ority unsecured creditors in the order listed in section 507, prior 
to any payment to general unsecured creditors? The answer, 
simply, is no. In chapter 9, a plan must provide for payment of 
administrative expense claims.605 The other unsecured priorities 
do not apply.606 In chapter 12, the Code does not require payment 
of specified priority tax claims on a priority basis at all, and trans-
forms those claims into general unsecured claims.607 Both chap-
ters 12 and 13 allow a debtor to retain equity in its property though 
unsecured creditors are not paid in full, and allow payment to 
general unsecured creditors before priority unsecured claims, so 
long as the plan provides for the ultimate payment of those prior-
ity claims in full.608 In both a consensual plan and a cramdown 
plan in chapter 11, the majority in an accepting class of employee 
wage and benefit plan claims, agricultural supplier claims, and 
consumer deposit claims, all of which are priority claims, can bind 
dissenters within that class to accept deferred payments that are 
subordinate in time of payment to lower priority claims.609 Those 
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priority claims held by dissenters may be paid even after junior 
unsecured claims are paid in full, equity has received interest in 
the reorganized debtor, the debtor has received its discharge and 
the court has closed the case.610 In a consensual chapter 11 plan 
approved by the requisite majorities of all voting classes, the abso-
lute priority rule does not apply at all, and shareholders can re-
tain their interests though creditors are not paid in full.611  
Most significantly, Congress has directed the bankruptcy courts 
to resolve a case in which a plan is not confirmable based on the 
best interest of creditors, not adherence to absolute distributional 
priorities.612 The Code gives the court broad discretion to approve 
a settlement that will facilitate such an outcome. 
A chapter 11 case in which the court finds that a plan is not 
confirmable and unsecured creditors will receive nothing, but in 
which a structured dismissal will provide some distribution to cred-
itors, should not present a quandary. Approving a structured dis-
missal upon such findings is the correct result. If the structured 
dismissal will result in the greatest good to the greatest number 
and is not the result of collusion, then the court should approve 
it. Congress, by a consistent course of enactments over more than 
sixty years, has made absolute priority a special, but limited, rule. 
The current Code does not prescribe adherence to the absolute pri-
ority rule in a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable 
and a structured dismissal pays something to creditors. The Code 
requires instead that a bankruptcy court approve a structured dis-
missal that is in the best interest of creditors. 
  
                                                                                                            
610 See supra Part III.C.2. 
611 See supra Part III.C.2. 
612 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). 
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EPILOGUE—THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN JEVIC 
The Supreme Court entered its opinion in Czyzewski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp. on March 22, 2017,613 when the publication of the 
print version of this issue of the William & Mary Business Law 
Review was imminent. This epilogue by the Author briefly sum-
marizes the opinion, its reach, and its likely effects. 
The Supreme Court in Jevic framed the question before it as 
whether, “in connection with a Chapter 11 dismissal,” a bank-
ruptcy court has the legal power to order the “priority-skipping 
kind of distribution scheme” that the bankruptcy court approved 
in the structured dismissal in Jevic.614 
The Court held that: “a bankruptcy court does not have such 
a power. A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the 
dismissal of a chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the 
affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply 
under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final dis-
tributions of estate value in business bankruptcies,”615 i.e., the 
rules that govern distributions in a chapter 7 liquidation or under 
a confirmed chapter 11 plan, respectively. 
Chapter 11 “foresees three possible outcomes,” the Court con-
tinued.616 The first is a confirmed chapter 11 plan.617 The second—
which “in effect confesses an inability to find a plan”—is conversion 
of the case to a chapter 7 proceeding for the liquidation and dis-
tribution of the debtor’s remaining assets.618 The third is a dis-
missal of the case that “aims to return to the prepetition financial 
status quo.”619 
The Court briefly considered the distributional scheme in a 
chapter 7 case, in which rigid adherence to the absolute priority 
rule is required. Distributions in chapter 7 must be made: first, to 
                                                                                                            
613 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649, 2016 October Term), 2017 WL 
1066259. 
614 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). 
615 Id. at *4. 
616 Id. 
617 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1141 (2012)). 
618 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a)–(b), 726). 
619 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), 349(b)(3)). 
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each secured creditor on account of its claim up to the extent of the 
value of its collateral;620 second, to the holders of priority unsecured 
claims (such as for administrative expenses, wages, and taxes) in 
the order of the priorities for those claims listed in section 507;621 
next to the holders of non-priority, general unsecured claims;622 and 
finally to the holders of equity in the enterprise.623 The Court ac-
knowledged that the Code provides somewhat more flexibility for 
distributions under chapter 11, but emphasized that “a bankruptcy 
court cannot confirm a plan that contains priority-violating distri-
butions over the objection of an impaired creditor class.”624 
The question of whether the structured dismissal in Jevic was 
permissible concerned “the interplay between the Code’s priority 
rules and a Chapter 11 dismissal.”625 The Court stated that the 
Code does not explicitly address distributions made at the time of 
the dismissal of a chapter 11 case, and asked: “Can a bankruptcy 
court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distribu-
tions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected 
creditors’ consent?”626 
The Court’s “simple answer to this complicated question” was 
“no.”627 In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized its view 
                                                                                                            
620 Id. at *5 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 725). Section 725 provides only that “the 
trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an 
entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not 
been disposed of,” and the Court’s citation to this section for the proposition 
stated is imprecise. Nonetheless, the proposition stated—that each secured 
creditor is entitled to payment of its claim up to the extent of the value of its 
collateral—is both true and well-established, pursuant to Supreme Court opin-
ions that generally preserve in bankruptcy a creditor’s lien created under state 
law, and section 506(a), which limits the distribution to the secured creditor to 
the value of its collateral. See supra notes 281–82, 284 and accompanying text. 
621 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726(a)(1)). 
622 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)). 
623 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6)). 
624 Id. at *5. 
625 Id. 
626 Id. at *10. 
627 Id. Prior to turning to this substantive question, the Court considered 
the respondents’ contention that the petitioning WARN claimants lacked 
standing. Id. at *8–9. The Court determined that the petitioners had standing 
because the bankruptcy court’s “approval of the structured dismissal cost peti-
tioners something. They lost a chance to obtain a settlement that respected 
their priority. Or, if not that, they lost the power to bring their own lawsuit on 
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that the Code’s “priority system constitutes a basic underpinning 
of business bankruptcy law,” and “has long been considered fun-
damental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation.”628 The importance 
of the priority system led the Court “to expect more than a simple 
statutory silence if, and when, Congress were to intend a major 
departure” that would authorize a structured dismissal that pro-
vided for priority-skipping distributions.629 
The Court found nothing in the statute that evinced this intent. 
Section 1112(b) authorizes the bankruptcy court to dismiss a chap-
ter 11 case. The Court noted: 
But the word, ‘dismiss’ itself says nothing about the power to 
make nonconsensual priority-violating distributions of estate 
value. Neither the word ‘structured,’ nor the word ‘conditions,’ 
nor anything else about distributing estate value to creditors pur-
suant to a dismissal appears in any relevant part of the Code.630 
The Court further emphasized its view that the dismissal pro-
visions of section 1112(b) and section 349(b), which govern the ef-
fect of the dismissal of a chapter 11 case, “seek a restoration of 
the prepetition financial status quo.”631 The Court considered the 
bankruptcy court’s statutory authority to “for cause, orde[r] other-
wise,” to be “designed to give courts the flexibility to ‘make the 
                                                                                                            
a claim that had a settlement value of $3.7 million. For standing purposes, a 
loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’” Id. at *9 (citing 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1961)). 
628 Id. at *10. 
629 Id. (“Congress … does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”) 
(quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). Two 
elephants are in the room, rather than in the mousehole, in the Author’s view. 
The first is Congress’s persistent dissatisfaction with the Court’s expansive 
view in Los Angeles Lumber (and now in Jevic) of the absolute priority rule. 
Congress acted on this dissatisfaction in its 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005 enact-
ments, which severely restricted the reach of the rule and negated most of Los 
Angeles Lumber. The second is the text of section 1112(b), which comes into 
play when a chapter 11 plan cannot be confirmed. That provision expressly 
directs a bankruptcy court to make its determination based on the “best inter-
est of creditors and the estate,” and not on the absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(e) (2012). The elephant occupying the mousehole, the Author argues, is the 
notion that the absolute priority rule applies to the resolution of a chapter 11 
case in which a plan is not confirmable. 
630 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)).  
631 Id. at *11. 
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appropriate orders to protect rights acquired in reliance on the 
bankruptcy case.’”632 
The Court did not extend its ruling to structured dismissals re-
garding which creditors did not object (and thus tacitly consented) 
to a priority-skipping structured dismissal. It “express[ed] no view 
about the legality of structured dismissals in general.”633 The 
Court also distinguished Iridium, the Second Circuit case upon 
which the Third Circuit had relied in part in Jevic.634 The Court 
noted that Iridium “did not involve a structured dismissal. It ad-
dressed an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund a 
litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s behalf.”635 
The Court also recognized that many other interim distribu-
tions made in a chapter 11 case—including those made pursuant 
to “first-day” orders such as wage, critical vendor, and financing 
orders that provide for a “roll-up” of a lender’s prepetition claim—
also are “priority-violating.”636 The Court emphasized that these 
                                                                                                            
632 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 338 (1978)). A settlement approved 
by the bankruptcy court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 clearly implicates 
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
Under the Court’s interpretation of the temporal scope of section 349(b), the 
rights acquired under a settlement reached and approved at some time prior 
to the dismissal of the chapter 11 case would be entitled to protection under 
section 349(b). Yet, those same rights acquired under a settlement reached and 
approved immediately prior to, and in contemplation of, such dismissal would 
not be entitled to protection under section 349(b). 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). The Jevic 
Court did not adopt the per se rule advanced by AWECO, pursuant to which a 
settlement reached at any time after the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case must comply with the absolute priority rule. Thus the question of how long 
before dismissal a settlement must be reached to be entitled to protection under 
section 349(b) remains unanswered. 
633 Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12 (citing In re Buffet Partners, L.P., 2014 
WL 3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., July 28, 2014)). The Third Circuit cited that 
same case in its decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s approval of the struc-
tured dismissal in Jevic. See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
634 Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12 (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 
F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
635 Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 459–460). 
636 Id. “First day” motions are those filed early in the case, typically with 
the chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which request the immediate relief that 
the chapter 11 debtor in possession asserts that it requires to continue to op-
erate in chapter 11. “First day” orders are those entered on those motions in 
the first few business days of a case, normally immediately following the court’s 
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and other interim distributions typically are founded on the goal of 
making “even the disfavored creditors better off,” including enabling 
reorganizations and thus maximizing the value of the estate.637 It 
suggested that the distributions under the Jevic settlement “more 
closely resemble[d] proposed transactions that lower courts have 
refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s pro-
cedural safeguards.”638 
The Court acknowledged that the Third Circuit in Jevic “did not 
approve nonconsensual priority-violating structured dismissals in 
general,” but had limited its ruling to the “rare case” in which the 
court found “sufficient reasons” to disregard priority.639 The Court 
rejected this approach because it was “difficult to give precise con-
tent to the concept “sufficient reasons,” which threatened to turn 
                                                                                                            
first hearing in the case. Examples include “first day” orders that authorize a 
chapter 11 debtor in possession to obtain new, post-bankruptcy financing 
and/or use its cash that is subject to a pre-bankruptcy lien. Many “first day” 
orders are priority-skipping, and authorize a chapter 11 debtor in possession 
to pay certain pre-bankruptcy claims, which it otherwise could not pay until 
the effective debt of its plan or other conclusion of the case. A “first day” wage 
order, for example, authorizes the payment of the pre-bankruptcy portion of 
payroll and employee benefits, absent which payment the employees are more 
likely to quit. A critical vendor order authorizes the payment early in the case of 
the pre-bankruptcy claims of certain key suppliers of goods or services—such as 
a supplier that provides a component part that is critical to the debtor’s manu-
facturing operation and cannot be reasonably obtained elsewhere—absent 
which payment the supplier is more likely to stop supplying such critical good or 
service. A “roll-up” is a new financing extended by the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy 
lender—under which the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim is paid off with the pro-
ceeds of the new, post-bankruptcy loan, and only the amount of the new loan 
in excess of the lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan balance is actually advanced to 
the debtor—absent which the lender is less likely to extend the new loan. All 
of these “first day” orders, and others, can result in payments that are priority-
skipping and favor certain creditors over others, enabling the favored creditors 
to receive more than they would under a confirmed chapter 11 plan or, if the 
case is converted to chapter 7, on the distribution at the conclusion of the chap-
ter 7 case. 
637 Id. (citing In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004); Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)). 
638 Id. at *13 (citing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 
1983); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Biolitec, 
Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. N.J. 2014); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 
118 (2d Cir. 2009)).  
639 Id. (citing In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
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a “rare case” exception into a more general rule.640 In the Court’s 
view, allowing the “rare case” exception would be the opening of the 
floodgates—resulting in uncertainty, the loss of protections given 
to priority claimants, collusion among insiders and senior and 
junior creditors to the detriment of those in the middle, increased 
litigation, and fewer settlements.641 
The Court concluded that Congress had not authorized the 
“rare case” exception.642 The courts could not “alter the balance 
struck by the statute.”643 The Court reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.644 
The dissent was founded on one of the most peculiar aspects of 
the path that the Jevic case took from the Court’s grant of certio-
rari through briefing and oral argument to decision.645 The Court 
had granted certiorari on the following issue: “[w]hether a bank-
ruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds 
in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.”646 
According to the petition, the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic 
deepened an existing split among the courts of appeals.647 The 
Second Circuit had held in Iridium that a settlement outside of a 
plan does not necessarily implicate the absolute priority rule, and 
may be approved if it maximizes creditor recoveries and there are 
specific and credible grounds for any deviation from the absolute 
priority rule.648 The Fifth Circuit in AWECO established, to the 
contrary, a per se rule, pursuant to which all settlements outside 
of a plan, reached at any time in the case, must comply with the 
absolute priority rule.649 
The dissent found dispositive that, after the Court granted cer-
tiorari, the petitioners had “recast the question” to whether a 
chapter 11 case may be terminated by a structured dismissal that 
                                                                                                            
640 Id. 
641 Id. at *13–14. 
642 Id. at *14. 
643 Id. (citing Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014)). 
644 Id. at *14. 
645 Id. at *15 (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J.). 
646 Id.  
647 Id. 
648 See supra notes 4, 487–91, 535–53, 583–85, 591–601 and accompanying 
text. 
649 See supra notes 5, 414–15, 491, 555–64 and accompanying text. 
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distributes estate property in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
priority scheme.650 
This question, the dissent asserted, was “narrower—and dif-
ferent”—than the one on which it had granted certiorari.651 It also 
was not the subject of a circuit conflict, because neither Iridium 
nor AWECO involved a structured dismissal.652 The respondents, 
relying on the Court’s Rules prohibiting the parties from changing 
the substance of the question presented, declined to brief the re-
cast question that the majority decided.653 The Court did not have 
the benefit of a full, adversarial briefing. It further would have 
“greatly benefit[ed] from the views of additional courts of appeals” 
on this “‘novel question of bankruptcy law’ arising in the rapidly 
developing field of structured dismissals.”654 The dissent would 
not have rewarded such “bait-and-switch tactics,” and would have 
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.655 
So where are the parties in Jevic left after the Supreme 
Court’s decision? And where does Jevic leave future parties with 
respect to settlements and distributions in chapter 11 that are out-
side of a plan? 
First, the petitioners in Jevic may or may not fair better on re-
mand. The Court’s ruling may reopen negotiations in Jevic, which 
may or may not result in a global settlement of the case. It may 
result in nothing more than a smaller settlement, all of which will 
go to administrative claimants (whose claims have distributional 
priority over those of the WARN claimants), or a larger settlement 
which will result in some distribution to the WARN claimants, or 
even no settlement at all and a conversion to chapter 7. In that 
latter case, the chapter 7 trustee may or may not decide to pursue 
the estate’s fraudulent conveyance claims against CIT and/or Sun, 
and if she decides to pursue those claims, may or may not prevail. 
The WARN claimants may or may not decide to pursue, as credi-
tors, their state law fraudulent conveyance claims against CIT 
and/or Sun, and if they decide to pursue those claims, may or may 
                                                                                                            
650 Id. at *15. 
651 Id. 
652 Id. 
653 Id. (citing SUP. CT. RS. 24.1(a), 14.1(a)). 
654 Id. (quoting In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
655 Id. (quoting S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1779, (2015) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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not prevail. If they prevail, their recovery may or may not be in an 
amount in excess of their legal fees and costs. 
One outcome, though, is clear. The WARN claimants cannot 
settle and by a structured dismissal obtain a distribution of their 
fourth priority unsecured employee claims that is prior to full pay-
ment of the second priority administrative expense claims in the 
case (which include the claims of the debtor’s and the creditors com-
mittee’s counsel and other professionals for their fees and expenses), 
unless those second priority claimants consent (see “Second” below). 
Second, a bankruptcy court may approve a structured dismissal 
the distributions under which are in accordance with section 726 
priorities, and a priority-skipping structured dismissal to which the 
adversely affected creditors have consented. The Court in Jevic ap-
pears to have accepted that a creditor’s tacit or constructive con-
sent, such as that arising from its failure to object to the proposed 
structured dismissal, is sufficient.656 
Third, a bankruptcy court may order distributions under “first 
day” orders, provided that those orders further the goal of enabling 
reorganizations and maximizing the value of the estate, and thus 
might increase distributions even to the disfavored creditors.657 
The bankruptcy court is not required to engage in an absolute pri-
ority analysis in connection with “first day” motions, except to this 
extenuated and fairly speculative extent. 
Fourth, pre-plan settlements authorized under Bankruptcy Rule 
9019 remain subject to the rule established by the Court in TMT.658 
That rule authorizes a bankruptcy court to approve a settlement if 
it is in the best interest of the estate based on “an educated estimate 
of the complexity, expense, and likely duration of such litigation, 
the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might 
be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assess-
ment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.”659 The Court in 
Jevic did not adopt AWECO’s per se rule requiring the bank-
ruptcy court in a chapter 11 case to approve a pre-plan settlement 
                                                                                                            
656 Id. at *12. 
657 Id. at *12. 
658 See supra Part IV. 
659 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 
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and the distributions under it only if it complies with the absolute 
priority rule.660 
Fifth, the Court did not prohibit a Rule 9019 settlement in ac-
cordance with TMT, followed by a “conversion of the case to a Chap-
ter 7 proceeding for liquidation of the business and a distribution 
of its remaining assets,” rather than by a structured dismissal of 
the case. Such conversion to chapter 7 is one of the three ways by 
which a chapter 11 case can be resolved under the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Jevic.661 
Sixth, the Jevic Court did not rule out “gifting,” whereby a se-
cured creditor or other senior creditor entitled to distributional pri-
ority agrees to give some or all of its property to a junior creditor, 
usually to settle a claim against it or resolve the chapter 11 case, 
skipping over creditors having intermediate priority.662 
Seventh, and finally, Congress may roll back—yet again—the 
reach of the absolute priority rule established by the Court in Los 
Angeles Lumber, as it did in 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005. If Congress 
does so, it likely will be because it has determined that, if a chap-
ter 11 plan cannot be confirmed, the debtor’s creditors are best 
served not by a rigid rule of absolute distributional priority, but 
by the Code’s leaving some “play in the joints” and authorizing 
other resolutions that are in the best interests of those creditors. 
 
                                                                                                            
660 The Court also did not reject the Second Circuit’s Iridium rule, which 
provides that a settlement outside of a plan does not necessarily implicate the 
absolute priority rule, and may be approved if it maximizes creditor recoveries 
and there are specific and credible grounds for any deviation from the absolute 
priority rule. Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12–13. 
661 Id. at *4. 
662 See, e.g., Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. 
Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
